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The idea of rationality enters an econometrician’s work in many ways; e.g., in his
presuppositions about sample populations, in his model selections and data analyses, and in his
choice of projects.  I shall consider some of these ways and their ramifications for the
econometrician’s own life and for the development of econometrics.
I begin in the first two sections of the paper with a discussion of rationality that I have found
in the writings of Aristotle and other leading philosophers.  My aim here is to establish the
characteristics that we in good faith can expect rational members of a sample population to possess.
The characteristics with which I end up have no definite meaning.  Instead they are like undefined
terms in mathematics that an econometrician can interpret in ways that suit the purposes of his
research and seem appropriate for the population he is studying.  When interpreted, the pertinent
characteristics of the rational members of a given population become hypotheses whose empirical
relevance must be tested.
To emphasize the undefined aspect of the characteristics that constitute my idea of rationality,
I designate a rational individual by the term 'rational animal.'  As such my 'rational animal' shares
many of the characteristics of Thomas Paine's 'common man' and of John Stuart Mill’s 'economic
man.'  My 'rational animal' also looks like Donald Davidson's 'rational animal' whose rationality
consists in it having all sorts of propositional attitudes     (cf. Davidson, 1982).  Whether my 'rational
animal,' like Davidson's, does have the use of language is a question that I do not raise.  However, all
the populations that I have in mind have the use of some kind of language.  Finally, the fact that the
empirical relevance of a given interpreted version of my 'rational animal' cannot be taken for granted,2
accords with Hempel's insistance that the assumption that man is rational is an empirical hypothesis
(cf. Hempel, 1962, p.5).
Donald McCloskey has written an interesting and enjoyable book about The Rhetoric of
Economics.  On pp. 83-86 in his book he discusses a paragraph from one of Robert Solow's many
seminal articles, (Solow 1957), and chides Solow for making use of the four master tropes of literary
form, metaphor, metanymy, synecdoche, and irony.  'Irony,' the most sophisticated of these
master tropes, is at work already in the first sentence of the paragraph: "In this day of rationally
designed econometric studies and super input-output tables, it takes something more than the usual
'willing suspension of disbelief' to talk seriously of the aggreagate production function…"
Supposedly, Solow is bowing ironically to rationally designed econometric studies. He as well as
part of his audience knew well that their rationality was in doubt.
I am not sophisticated enough to recognize the absurdity of Solow's reference to 'rationally
designed econometric studies.'  Instead of being ironic I believe that Solow had in mind the kind of
econometrics that he himself so ingeniously displayed in the remainder of his article.  So, for better or
worse, in sections three and four of my paper I walk along the path that Solow was walking in his
article and give an interpretation of 'rationally designed econometric studies' that I think Solow in
1957 would have liked.
In rationally designed econometric studies the interpretation of a 'rational animal' that seems
appropriate for a given study is usually an interpretation that the pertinent econometrician extracts
from various economic theories.  I take a close look at some of these interpretations in section three
of the paper and discuss their empirical relevance.  The interpretations of particular interest concern
consumer choice under certainty, choice under risky and uncertain conditions, and choice in game-
theoretic situations.  These interpretations appear in various representations in the ways
econometricians model rationality.  I cannot discuss all such models.  So in section four I limit the
discussion to microeconometric models of consumer choice and macroeconometric rational
expectations models.  All the models I consider appear in good examples of rationally designed
econometric studies.3
Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos have proposed two thought provoking models of the
historical development of scientific endeavors.  Kuhn envisions science as a field of various ‘normal
sciences’ in which researchers are solving puzzles that one or more past scientific achievements have
supplied (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 10-11 and 35-36).  Lakatos views science as a field of all sorts of
scientific research programmes in which researchers are seeking ways to extend the positive heuristic
of the programme (Lakatos, 1978, pp. 47-52).  In a given ‘normal science’ researchers “are
committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice.”  Also they do not “normally aim to
invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by others” (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 11
and 24). In a scientific research program the scientist builds his models in accordance with
prescriptions that are articulated in the positive heuristic of his programme.  “He ignores actual
counter examples”…”in the hope that they will turn, in due course, into corroborations of the
programme” (Lakatos, 1978, pp.50 and 52).  Neither Kuhn nor Lakatos deliberates about the
motives that guide a scientist in his choice of puzzles and positive heuristics.  Also, they have little to
say about the social aspects involved in the writing of scientific reports.
In the last two sections of the paper I consider the two lacunas in Kuhn’s and Lakatos’
theories, and see how econometricians go about solving puzzles and extending positive heuristics.
Specifically, I discuss, first, the considerations that guide an econometrician in his choice of research
projects.  Then, I argue about the determinants of rational choice in model selection.  Since Kuhn
and Lakatos are primarily concerned with the choices of scientists in the hard sciences, the ideas I
present here differ from theirs. These ideas might also differ from those of the average
econometrician, since he might not agree with the econometric methodology in which I believe (cf..
Stigum, 1995).  Finally, I consider the politics of writing research reports.  The contents of these
sections concern aspects of an econometrician’s rational choice that are relevant for the orderly
development of econometrics.   I hope, therefore, that the reader will find my views interesting
enough to warrant discussion.
I.   A Philosopher's Concept of Rationality4
One of the many socially constructed facts that I have learned to accept, insists that a human
being is a rational animal.  Philosophers, usually without proper reference, attribute this assertion
to Aristotle.  I shall begin my search for a suitable concept of rationality for econometrics by
delineating Aristotle's idea of a rational animal.  My main sources are translations of and
philosophical commentaries to Aristotle's treatises, De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics.
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I.1  Rational Animals
Aristotle had a simple scheme for classifying elements in the physical world.  There were two
realms, the inorganic world and the organic world.  All living things and no others belonged to the
organic world.  Aristotle arranged the living things in turn into three life classes according to their
possession of various basic faculties.  Vegetable life consisted of all living things that had just two
faculties, the powers of nutrition and reproduction.  Animal life consisted of all living things that had
the powers of nutrition and reproduction and the sensation of touch.  Finally, human life consisted of
all living things that had the powers of nutrition and reproduction, the sensation of touch, and the
faculty of deliberative imagination.
For our purposes it is important to keep in mind the role of touch and deliberative
imagination in Aristotle's characterization of animal life and human life.  Aristotle allowed that animals
may have many sensations in addition to touch.  However, touch was to him "the only sense, the
deprivation of which necessitates the death of animals.  For neither [was] it possible for anything that
is not an animal to have this sense, nor [was] it necessary for anything that is an animal to have any
sense beyond it" (Aristotle, de Anima, p. 143).  Consequently, an animal was a living thing that had
the sensation of touch and the faculties of a member of vegetable life.
The case of deliberative imagination is a bit more involved.  According to Aristotle,
imagination was the faculty of mind by which an animal forms images of things that are not present to
the senses or within the actual experience of the animal involved.  As such imagination was not
sensation although an animal could not have imagination without having the faculty of sensation.
Aristotle conceived of two kinds of imagination, imagination derived from sensation and deliberative5
imagination.  Sensitive imagination, he claimed, "[was] found in the lower animals but deliberative
imagination [was] found only in those animals which [were] endowed with reason" (de Anima, Book
III, Chapter XI).   Also an animal could not have the power of reason without having imagination.
Since none of the lower animals had reason, it follows that the higher animals; i.e., the human beings
had to be animals with the power of deliberative imagination.
A rational animal is more than an animal with deliberative imagination.  Here is why.  It was
the case that an animal with deliberative imagination had the faculty of  reason, and an animal with
reason had the faculty of deliberative imagination. To deliberate means to weigh alternatives, and that
is an act of reason.  Therefore, it was the case that an animal with the faculty of deliberative
imagination and the power of reason would also have the ability to form opinions.  Finally, it was the
case that an animal could not have the ability to form opinions without having the faculty of
deliberative imagination (de Anima, Book III, Chapter III).  But if that is so, we may claim that a
human being is an animal with the faculties of deliberative imagination, opinion, and reason.
Consequently, if a human being is a rational animal, we may adopt the following characterization of
rational animals:
An animal is rational if an only if it has deliberative
imagination and is able to opine and reason.
I.2  Deliberative Imagination, Opinion, and Reason
I believe that the preceding assertion gives an adequate rendition of Aristotle's idea of
rational animals.  However, to get a good idea of what it means for an animal to be rational, we
must take a closer look at the meanings of deliberative imagination, opinion, and reason.
To me the three terms, deliberative imagination, opinion, and reason are like undefined terms
in mathematics.  They have no definite agreed-upon meaning.  Instead their meanings are culturally
determined and vary over individuals as well as over groups of individuals.  Here is what I have in
mind.6
The wealth of images that an individual can create with his deliberative imagination depends
on many things.  It depends on the physical and mental sensations that he has experienced: e.g., the
places he has visited and the persons he has met..  It also depends on his schooling and his abilities
and inclinations.  Finally, it depends on the cultural traditions with which he grew up. A Californian
might dream of UFOs traversing  the sky, and a Norwegian youngster might fantasize about trolls
and seductive maidens with long tails roaming a nearby forest at night.
Individuals have all sorts of opinions.  Some opinions pertain to personal lives. They
determine likes and dislikes of things and ideas and proper attitudes to fellow men..  Other opinions
pertain to the society in which the individuals in question live.  They may concern the appropriateness
of customs; e.g.., the circumcision of women,  and the usefulness of various structural aspects; e.g.,
the political independence of a central bank. Still other opinions pertain to the validity of theories and
socially constructed facts.  They may concern the power of ghosts and the right of  biologists to
produce clones of human beings.  Opinions may vary in surprising ways over individuals as witnessed
in the next example.
E.1  In her book, In a Different Voice, Carol Gilligan theorizes about differences in the character
development of men and women.  One of the experiments she describes is relevant for us.
            A psychiatrist tells two eleven-year-old children, a boy and a girl, a sad story.  Al and Liz are happily
married.  Liz is sick and will die unless she gets a medicament, C.  Al has no money to buy C and the nearest
druggist refuses to give it to him.  That presents Al with two options, steal C to save his wife's life or watch his
wife die.  What should he do?
            The boy argues that Al ought to steal C since the druggist's loss of C would be minor relative his gain from
C saving Liz's life.  He also suggests that, if Al were caught, he would receive a light sentence, since the judge
would agree that Al did the right thing.
            The girl insists that it is not right that a person should die if her life could be saved.  Still Al ought not to
steal C.   Instead he should try to persuade the druggist to give him C and promise to pay him back later.
            Gilligan recants that the boy in the experiment actually preferred English to math and that the girl aspired to
become a scientist.  Still, the boy relied on conventions of logic to resolve the dilemma, assuming that most
people would agree to these conventions.  The girl relied on a process of communication to find a solution to the
dilemma, assuming that most people will respond to a reasonable plea for help (cf. Gilligan, pp. 24-32).
It is interesting here that Aristotle insisted that a person could not have an opinion without
believing in what he opined.  Hence, opinion was followed by belief.  In fact, "every opinion [was]7
followed by belief, as belief [was] followed by persuasion, and persuasion by reason" (de Anima, p.
108).  Persuasion concerns all matters on which an individual might have an opinion.  It occurs in
familiar places; e.g., at home, in class rooms and lecture halls, and in day-to-day interactions with
friends and acquaintances.  We experience it in different forms; e.g., as gentle parental coaxing, as
socially constructed facts in books and newspapers, and as results of heated discussions.  The beliefs
we acquire in this way may be well founded or just fixed ideas as evidenced in E.2, where I
paraphrase an observation of E.E. Evans-Pritchard.
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            E.2  I have no particular knowledge of meteorology.  Still I will insist that rain is due to natural causes.  This
belief of mine is not based on observation and inference.  It is part of my cultural heritage.  A savage might
believe that, under suitable natural and ritual conditions, the appropriate magic can induce rain.  His belief will
also not be based on observation and inference.  It forms part of his cultural heritage, and he has adopted it
simply by being borne into it.  Both he and I are thinking in patterns of thought that the societies in which we live
have provided for us.
To Aristotle reason was the instrument by which a person thinks and forms conceptions.
Reason could be passive or active. The passive reason in an infant was pure potentiality.  In a
learned person the passive reason became the capacity of thinking itself (de Anima, Book III,
Chapter IV).   The active reason was reason activated by desire.  Depending on the pertinent object
of desire the active reason would result in choice of action or judgment concerning truth and
falsehood or what is right or wrong.  The reasoning involved was true if it was logical and based on
premises that either were true by necessity or accepted as true by the wise.  Also, the desire was
right if it reflected an appetition for a good end.  The choices and the judgments concerning right or
wrong were good if they resulted from true reasoning and a  right desire.  The judgments concerning
truth and falsehood were good if they were logical consequences of premises that were true by
necessity.
The validity of necessary truths and the well-foundedness of premises that the wise have
accepted are often questionable.  Besides, some of the premises of the wise may reflect attitudes that
we cannot condone.  Here are a few examples to illustrate what I have in mind.8
Consider the law of the excluded middle.   Aristotle believed that the law was true by
necessity, and most mathematicians today agree with him.  The Dutch intuitionists (DI), however,
think differently. They insist that a declarative sentence denotes truth or falsehood according as it, or
its negation, can be verified.  If neither the sentence nor its negation is verifiable, the sentence is
neither true nor false.  Here are two cases in point:
(1) There are three consecutive 7 in the decimal expansion of p, and
(2) There are integers of which nobody ever will have thought.
At present the truth value of the first sentence is unknown, and it is conceivable that no human being
will ever determine it.  Satisfying the predicated relation in the second sentence involves a
contradiction, and determination of its falsehood is inconceivable.  According to the DI these
sentences are at present neither true nor false.
Similarly, the  well-foundedness of premises that the wise have accepted is often uncertain.
We see that in the way scientific knowledge changes over time.  For example, Aristotle believed that
water was one of five basic substances that could combine with other substances to form
compounds but could not be broken down to simpler substances.  His idea was dispelled when H.
Cavendish in 1775 succeeded in showing that hydrogen and oxygen combined to form water.  We
also see it in historical records describing dire consequences of government policies that were based
on defunct economic theories.  One recent example is from Peru..  There the changes in land
ownership that the military junta carried out between 1968 and 1980  had a disastrous effect on farm
output.  The military and their US advisers based their policies on the economic theory of labor
managed firms, a theory that had next to no empirical relevance under Peruvian conditions.  The
Peruvian farm laborers did not have the knowledge nor the ability to acquire the knowledge of how
to manage large farms.
Finally, some of the premises that the wise accept, may reflect attitudes that we cannot
condone.  One example is the maxim that  the end always justifies the means.  When other
arguments fail, governments use this maxim to justify all sorts of interventions.  One example is from
the nineteen nineties' 'Bank Crisis' in Norway.  To solve the crisis the labor government assumed9
ownership of the three largest Norwegian banks.  As far as I can tell, there was no good economic
reason why the take-overs were necessary.  Besides, the government's handling of the case
displayed a shocking disregard for the individual citizen in its refusing to compensate the
stockholders.  The  Russian 1956- and 1968- massacres of innocent people in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia provide us with a different example.  In private conversations, an internationally
known scientist: i.e., a very wise man, told me that the Russians'  vision of Eastern Europeans living in
bliss under communism justified the atrocities
Now the upshot as far Aristotle's active reason goes:  If necessary truths might be invalid,
and if the judgments of the wise may be questioned, then true reason and right desire cannot be well
determined.  They must vary with the culture in which an individual has been brought up, and they are
likely to vary with individuals in one and the same community.  But if that is so, then Aristotle's active
reason is like an undefined term with no definite meaning.  This indefiniteness faces us everywhere
and at all times.  We become acutely aware of it when we meet people and experience events in real
life or in books and newspapers that we cannot  understand. The associated problems may concern
family relations or the increasing violence in the streets.  They may also concern  aspects of human
rights or just the senseless wars on the Balkans.  Finally, they may concern the disparate premises of
the religions that provide people with standards of right and wrong.  The next example describes an
important case in point.
E.3  The question is: Should a doctor be allowed to help a mortally sick patient die
prematurely?  In Norway the Church and the Law say no.  However, many influential people say yes and argue
strongly for changing the Law accordingly.
In 1996 a forty-five-year old person, mortally sick with multiple sclerosis, asked her doctor to help her die.
The doctor agreed and gave her an overdose of morphine.  Later, the doctor asked the Courts to try him for
murder.  He was hoping that the trial would start the process of changing the Law so that active death help under
strict provisions would be allowed
As the first of its kind, the case is currently going through the court system in Norway.  The lower court
found the doctor guilty of premeditated manslaughter, but refused to punish him.  Both the doctor and the
prosecutor appealed the verdict to a higher court.  In the higher court the jury found him not guilty of
manslaughter.  The judges, however, insisted that the doctor was guilty and overruled the jury.  That meant that
the same court must convene with different judges and try the case anew.  Knowledgeable people believe that the
case will end in the Supreme Court and be decided for good there.10
I.3  Universality, Necessity, and Rules
The preceding discussion left us with a vague idea of a rational animal.  We found out that a
rational animal was an animal with deliberative imagination, beliefs, opinions, and reason.  We also
noticed that the four characteristic features of rational animals were to be likened to undefined terms
in mathematics that have no definite meaning.  The same must be the case for Aristotle's idea of
rational animals.  Hence, if we accept Aristotle's ideas, we should expect to meet all sorts of rational
animals.  That is not disconcerting since the people we meet in life are all so different.
There are three aspects of Aristotle's idea of rational animals that are striking.  His notion of a
rational animal is universal in the sense that it characterizes all human beings, be they atheists or
priests, ignoramuses or scholars, or just infants or grown-ups.   Also, he insists that the choices and
judgements of rational animals are good choices and judgements only if they, in accordance with the
rules of logic, follow by necessity from proper premises and right desires.  In our search for a
concept of rationality for econometrics, we shall look for a concept that share these two
characteristics of Aristotle's idea of rationality.  Hence we shall insist that a rational person is an
animal with deliberative imagination, beliefs, opinions, and reason.  Also rational choices and
judgements are good choices and judgements that, in accordance with the rules of logic,
follow by necessity from proper premises and right desires.
Since rational choices and judgements are to be good choices and judgements, a few
remarks concerning Aristotle's idea of the 'good' are called for.  To Aristotle the 'good' was that at
which every art and inquiry and every action and pursuit aim.  Also the 'good' was something that
people search for its own sake.  Finally, the 'good' was an activity of the soul in accordance with
moral and intellectual virtue.  This extraordinary good Aristotle identified with happiness
(Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 1-24).   
Most people associate living well and faring well with being happy.  Yet, different persons
are likely to differ considerably in their ideas as to  what happiness actually is.  A sick person may
identify happiness with health and a poor person may associate it with wealth.  Similarly, a youngster
may associate happiness with pleasure, and a politician may identify it with honor.  They are all11
wrong.  In Aristotle's vocabulary health, wealth, pleasure and honor were not different aspects of the
'good.'  Instead they were means in the pursuit of the 'good' which Aristotle designated by happiness.
According to Aristotle, happiness was an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect
virtue.  Also, a virtue was a state of character.  Virtues came in two forms.  One was moral.  The
other was intellectual.  Individuals acquired moral virtues by habit.  For example, they became just
by carrying out just acts and brave by performing  brave acts.   Similarly, persons developped
intellectual virtues in schools and  through individual studies.  For example, they acquired
philosophical wisdom from intuitive reasoning and scientific research.  They acquired practical
wisdom by developing a true and reasoned capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or
bad for man.  Thus a person acquired virtues by habit and practice.  In the process the person also
learned to appreciate the virtuous and to enjoy the happiness it brought him.
What is virtuous in one society need not be virtuous in another.  Also what one wise person
considers virtuous another may dispute. In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle insisted that truly
virtuous persons would, in all situations that involve choice and moral judgements, adhere to the so-
called Doctrine of the Golden Mean.  In such situations "excess [was] a form of failure, and so [was]
defect, while the intermediate [was] praised and [was] a form of success; and being praised and
being successful [were] both characteristics of virtue." Thus virtue was kind of a mean.  For example,
courage was a mean between fear and confidence and pride was a mean between dishonor and
honor (Nichomachean Ethics, pp. 38-41). Inter-esting  aspects of this doctrine have a good hold on
the minds of many of my fellow citizens in Norway.  There children grow up with the idea that it is
not virtuous to show off.  The school system is designed so that  poor students may survive,  average
students may do well, and bright students have little or no opportunity to perform according to their
abilities.  And the solidarity principle, which underlies the income-distribution policy of the
government, ensures that disposable income does not vary too much over a huge majority of the
population.
Aristotle's Doctrine of the Golden Mean will not play a role in my search for a useful concept
of rationality in econometrics.  However, as the examples from Norway indicate, I cannot ignore the
fact that rules and regulations that emanate from lawmakers and other authorities have a determining12
influence on what the average citizen considers virtuous.  To the extent that these rules and
regulations reflect aspects of Aristotle's doctrine, the doctrine will form a part of my idea of what
constitutes rational conduct and judgement
II  Universality, Proper Premises, and Right Desires
Rational animals live and function in the social reality we described in Chapter 2.  We know
that they are alike in having deliberative imagination, beliefs, opinions, and reason.  In this section we
shall see if they are alike in other respects as well. To find out, we look for answers to three
questions:  Is it true that two different rational animals in a given choice situation necessarily will make
the same choices?   If they happen to make different choices, what are the chances that we may
persuade one of them to change his or her choice?  Finally, is it likely that two individuals from one
and the same society will act and make judgments on the basis of premises that all the members of
their society accept?
II.1  Rational Animals in Choice Situations
We go through life experiencing all sorts of situations in which we are called upon to make a
choice.  Some times the number of alternatives we face is small. It is for Norwegian parents when
their children come of age and must attend primary school.  There are many public schools and just
a few private schools.  Most parents send their children to a public school in their neighborhood.
Other times the number of alternatives we face is considerable.  It is for the unfortunate person who
must acquire a new car.  There are many different car makes. Each make comes in many different
models, and every model has any number of representatives from which the person may choose.
Finally,  there are times when the number of alternatives is hard to fathom.  It is for the young man
who must choose an education for  access to a life-long stream of income that will enable him to
satisfy his various future needs.  He can decide to start his education now or wait  a year.  If he waits
a year, he can take a parttime job and devote lots of time to his favorite hobbies and leisure
activities.  He can also take a full-time job and save money to pay for his education.13
Two rational animals in one and the same choice situation are unlikely to be alike in all
pertinent matters.  A second look at the choice situations I described above will bear witness to that.
In the choice of school for a child  the abilities and character of the child are pertinent matters.  So
are also the upbringing of the parents, their visions for the future of the child, and the roles they play
in the neighborhood in which they live.  In the choice of a new car the buyer's budget constraint, his
knowledge of cars, and the purposes for which he needs a car are pertinent matters.  So are also the
time the buyer has allotted to searching for a new car, the supply of cars in his neighborhood, and his
ideas as to the kind of car he ought to be driving.   In the choice of career the number of pertinent
matters are as numerous as the alternatives the young man faces.  A few of them are his character
and upbringing, his abilities and good health, and the financial constraints he is confronting.  So also
are the availability and costs of schooling, the current employment situation, and his visions of
opportunities and the kind of life he wants to live.
We are looking for a concept of rationality according to which rational choices follow by
necessity from proper premises and the use of rules of logic.  The preceding observations suggest
that there are only two reasonable ways to test whether the choices of rational animals have this
property:  We can observe the actions of a given person in similar choice situations, or we can
construct simple choice experiments in which a subject's impertinent attributes are stripped of
influence.  I shall describe two such tests below.
If a given rational animal's choices follow by necessity from proper premises and the use of
rules of logic, we should expect that he in similar choice situations always will make the same choice.
In the following example we question such consistency of a single rational animal's choices.
Specifically, the example describes a way of testing the consistency of consumer choice of
commodity vectors.  The test is one that Paul Samuelson suggested many years ago (cf. Samuelson
1950, pp.    ).
E.4  Consider a consumer, A, and suppose that in the price-income situation, (p
0, I
0), A chooses the
commodity vector, x
0.  Suppose also that  x
1 is an other commodity vector and that  x





0.  Then A has revealed that he prefers  x
0  to  x









In this case the premises are threefold.  One insists that A has a consistent ordering of commodity
vectors.  The other claims that A, in a given price-income situation, always chooses the vector in his budget set
that he ranks the highest.  The third prescribes that A's ordering of commodity vectors is such that there always
is just one vector in a pertinent budget set that he will rank as the highest.
If A is rational in accordance with the concept of rationality that we are seeking, the conclusion: i.e., the




0 must hold, is valid with one very strong proviso:  A's ordering of commodity
vectors when he chooses x
1 is the same as when he chose x
0.
The proviso in E.4 is hard to accept.  A consumer's ordering of commodity vectors is likely
to change over time for many reasons.  It may change with the ages of family members or because
some family member develops a liking for a special component of the commodity vector.  The
ordering may also change with the price-income expectations of the consumer.  If the expectations at
(p
1, I
1) differ from those at (p
0, I
0), Samuelson's test would be invalid.
Two-person non-cooperative game theory is full of ideas for laboratory experiments in which
we can check whether two persons in one and the same choice situation will make the same choices.
I describe one of them in E.5.
E.5   Consider two persons, A and B, who dislike each other enough so that they under no circumstances
would be willing to communicate.  A third person, C, has persuaded them to participate in a game of the following
sort:  A and B are to choose one of two letters, a and b.  If they both choose a (b), C will pay them both $ 100
($10).  If A chooses a (b) and B chooses b (a), C will charge A  $ 200 for the game and pay B  $ 300  (pay A $ 300
and charge B $ 200 for the game).  A (B) must make his choice without knowing which letter B (A) is choosing.
Both A and B know all the consequences of the game and have agreed to the rules of the game.
The game A and B will be playing is a model of the game called "A Prisoner's Dilemma" with  payoff
matrix as shown below.  All the entries in the matrix denote so many dollars.
                                                                     B's Strategies
                                                               a                            b
                              a           100,100                 -200,300                                                                                 A's
Strategies
                                            b            300,-200                    10,10
An equilibrium in game theory is a Nash Equilibrium.  It has the property that each player, once his opponent's
strategy has been revealed, is satisfied with his own choice of strategy.  In the present game there is one and only
one equilibrium.  It prescribes that both A and B choose the letter b.15
In E.5 A and B start out with the same premises and the same information.  Also the payoff
matrix is symmetric in the sense that neither A nor B would have anything against exchanging names.
It seems, therefore, that if A and B are rational, according to any concept of rationality that we may
seek, they must end up choosing the same letter.  Game theorists insist that the rational thing for A
and B to do is to choose b.  This is so because b is the only choice which A and B afterwards will
not regret having made.  So far the idea of regret has played no part in our discussion of rationality.
Hence a philosopher is still free to reject the game theorists' claim by arguing as follows.  A and B
are both rational.  Therefore, in the given choice situation they will choose the same letter.  Being
rational, A and B will figure out that they will choose the same letter.  The best letter for them both is
a.  Hence the rational thing for A and B to do is to choose a (cf. Brown 1990, pp. 3-6).
It is one thing to argue what rational people ought to do when facing a prisoner's dilemma.
Another thing is to find out what people actually do in such a choice situation.  The evidence from
experimental economics is mixed.  In some cases the pertinent pair chooses an a.  In other cases the
pair chooses a b.  In still other cases one member of the pair chooses an a while the other member
chooses a b.  On the whole, there seems to be more bs among the chosen letters than as.  That is
not strange since choosing b is not just a Nash equilibrium strategy for the two players.  It is a
dominant strategy for both players.  And, if that is not enough, it is also a maxi-min strategy for
them.  To wit: If A (or B) chooses a he may loose    $ 200 ($ 200).  If he chooses b, he might
receive $ 10 rather than $ 100.
The experiment in E.6 bears out the import of the preceding remarks. The experiment was
conceived of and carried out by Russel W. Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and
Thomas W. Ross(cf. Cooper et al, 1991).  Douglas DeJong provided me with the numbers I have
recorded in the table.
E.6  Consider a prisoner's-dilemma experiment in which we pair 42 subjects with each other in a sequence
of matchings.  By letting each subject encounter each other subject only once we can generate a sequence of
forty different matchings in which each matching contains twenty single-stage games.  In 1991|Cooper et al.
carried out such an experiment.  They recorded the following results:16
Matchings                                             1-5          6-10          11-15          16-20
Percentage of (a,a) pairs                      17%         10%            7%               6%
              Percentage of (b,b) pairs                      32%         45%           57%            67%
              Percentage of (a,b) and (b,a) pairs      51%         45%           36%            27%
II.2  Regrets and Rational Choice
We have seen that it is next to impossible to divine circumstances in real life in which we can
check whether rational animals in one and the same choice situation make the same choice.  We
have also seen that in experimental settings in which we would expect  rational animals to make the
same choice, they need not do so.  The last example suggests that when two individuals in a
prisoner's dilemma situation make different choices, one of them will have regrets and choose
differently the next time he is called upon to choose.  That fact raises an interersting question:
Suppose that we have observed that a supposedly rational person makes a choice that we consider
to be nonrational.  Will it be possible for us to persuade him to change his choice?  We shall try to
answer that question next.
Philosophers believe that it is an essential characteristic of a rational person that he will be
willing to mend his ways if he finds out that he has erred in choice or conduct.  I am not so sure.  If
two rational animals in the same choice situation make different choices, one of three things must be
the case.  Both individuals consider the consequences of their choices equivalent. One of them have
made a logical error.  Or the two have made use of different logics.  In the first case it makes no
sense to ask one of the two individuals to mend his ways.  In the other two cases the success of
persuasion may depend on many factors some of which I shall indicate below.
First logical errors.  Logical errors in our reasoning crop up in many situations. Since a logical
error is like a false arithmetical calculation, we would expect that an erring person who discovers his
error will recalculate and change his choice.  Whether he actually will recalculate, however, may
depend on the situation.  For example, at home a given person may miscalculate the remaining
balance in his checking account and write a check too many.  Then the bank will make sure that he
mends his ways.  At work his search for solutions to a given problem may be based in part on
unfounded beliefs and flimsy evidence.  What is worse, the arguments he  employs may suffer from ill17
specified a priori assumptions that are either inapplicable in the circumstances he envisages or lead to
circular reasoning.  If he is a reasonable person , he  probably would redo his reasoning if he became
aware of such fallacies.  Finally, as a consultant on the side, he may base his forecasts of future
business conditions on assumptions that others might consider utterly unrealistic.  Even if these others
manage to convince him of that, he might not change his ways as long as his forecasts are good.
Next different logics.  It might at first sound impossible that in a given situation two persons
may choose differently because they make use of different logics.  However, E.5 provides us with a
good illustration of such a possibility  There A might argue as a game theorist and choose b while B
argues as a philosopher and chooses a.  We might convince B that his logics was fallacious.
However, it would be to no avail since the rules of the game do not allow him to change his strategy.
There are many reasons why two supposedly rational persons in a given choice situation
might make use of  different logics.  For example, their attitudes toward pertinent logical and
nonlogical premises may differ.  So also may their conceptions of the choice alternatives they face.
The possibility that decision makers make use of different logics is important to econometrics.
Therefore, I shall give several examples below that illustrate how it can happen.
When I compare the choice of two rational animals in a given choice situation, I presume that
the two start out with the same premises and face the same consequences of their actions.  The
premises may insist that the two obey the laws of their society and adhere to a certain moral code.
For example, you shall not steal or cheat on taxes, and you shall not inflict wounds on other persons
willfully.  The consequences may include a record  of possible monetary gains as well as a list of
various penalties for breaking the law.  If two persons' premises and consequences are the same,
only different logics cause them to make different choices.  Different logics may reflect different
attitudes toward the strictures of the law as well as different assignment of probabilities to possible
gains and losses.  E.7 bears witness to that.
E.7  In Norway many persons find it to their advantage to sneak out of paying fares on trolleys and
busses.  The fares are costly.  Also,  the chance of being caught sneaking is small, and the penalty when caught
is low.  Finally, since there are no public records of who has been caught sneaking, the punishment for sneaking
amounts to only a smidgen  more than the fine and a day of bad mood.18
The sneaking on trolleys and busses is extensive enough to make the companies that run them
concerned.  A few years back the companies carried out a campaign in which they appealed to the moral attitudes
of their customers and asked them to mend their ways.  The campaign had no appreciable effect.  It seemed that
the only way to induce a sneaking person to stop sneaking was to raise the penalty and to increase the frequency
of controls.  The companies ended up doubling the penalty for being caught while leaving the frequency of
controls more or less as it had always been.
In the next example I describe a choice situation in which a very wise person and an ordinary
citizen apply different logics because of their radically different attitudes toward uncertainty.
E.8  In a classical article on exchangeable events and processes Bruno de Finetti insisted that subjective
probabilities had to be additive.  If a person's assignment of probabilities to mutually exclusive uncertain events
were not additive, de Finetti could make a fool of  the person by inducing him to partake in an unfavorable bet (cf.
De Finetti 1964,pp. 102-104).  To me this was long an incontestable fact that I now  will show is no fact at all.
Consider an ordinary grown-up rational animal, A, who faces two events, E1and its complement E2.  We
may think of E1 as the event that Clinton will be impeached.  Also, suppose that A is a person who deals with
uncertainty by shading his subjective probabilities.  He assigns probability 1/3 to the occurrence of E1 and
probability 1/3 to the occurrence of E2.  Finally, suppose that A's utility function on the set of consequences is
linear in all situations in which gains and losses can be measured in dollars. Let us see how de Finetti would make
a Dutch Book against A
To present deFinetti's arguments I let  S=(S1,S2)  designate a security that will pay the owner  $S1  if  E1
occurs and  $S2  if  E2  occurs.  De Finetti takes for granted that S is worth 1/3($S1) + 1/3($S2) to A and that A
should be willing to issue S and sell S for a smidgen more than what S is worth to him.  With that  assumption in
hand, de Finetti  shows that, for any positive pair of numbers, (g,h), he can find a pair, (S1,S2), that satisfies the
equations,
                  g =  S1 - (1/3)S1 - (1/3)S2   and   h =  S2 - (1/3)S1 - (1/3)S2.
From these equations it follows that, by buying the solution, S = (S1,S2), from A, de Finetti can ensure himself a
gain of about  $g if  E1 were to occur and $h  if  E2  were to occur.
In the present case de Finetti is wrong about the value of S to A.  In choice under uncertainty A orders
uncertain options in accordance with the axioms that we discuss on pp. 34-36 below.  If S = (S1,S2) is the solution
to the two equations, then to him  (S1,0) is worth 1/3($S1),  (0,S2) is worth 1/3($S2), and  S is worth 1/3($S1) +
2/3($S2)  if  S2 £ S1, and  2/3($S1) + 1/3($S2) if  S1£ S2.  There is no way in which de Finetti can make a Dutch Book
against A.
In E.8 I followed de Finetti in assuming that A's utility function is linear in money.  Also, for
simplicity, I considered a case with just two events.  Neither of these assumptions is critical for the19
conclusion: It need not be irrational to shade one's probabilities in the face of uncertainty.  If it is not,
it makes no sense to ask A in E.8 to mend his ways.
There are many situations in which it makes no sense to ask somebody to mend his ways if
his ways appear irrational to us.  In some such cases the attempt would be futile.  For example,
persuasion will be to no avail in the case of an alcoholic.  He must find out by himself that life would
improve if he were to stop drinking.  In other cases sound arguments will have next to no effect.
Certainly, a lecture on the characteristics of purely random processes is unlikely to find an open mind
in somebody who is suffering from an acute case of the gambler's fallacy.  In still other cases any
arguments that we may dream up might be incomprehensible to the supposedly irrational person and
hence come to naught.  Here is an example that illustrates what I have in mind.
E.9  The African Azande entertain beliefs that appear strange to us.  For example, they believe that
certain fellow members are witches who exercise malignant occult influence on the lives of other members.  Also,
they engage in practices that are incomprehensible to us.  For example, they perform rituals to counteract
witchcraft, and they consult oracles to protect themselves against harm.
Since oracles often contradict themselves and come up with fallacious prophecies, it seems that a
Zande's life must be filled with disturbing contradictions.   Contradictions once brought down George Cantor's
beautiful 'house' of sets.  However, they do not seem to have much effect on the lives of the Azande.  According
to E. E. Evans-Pritchard, using contradictions in which oracles are involved to demolish the oracles' claim to
power, would be to no avail.  If such arguments were translated into Zande modes of thought, they would serve
to support the Zande's  entire structure of belief.  The Zande's mystical notions are eminently coherent   They are
interrelated by a network of logical ties, and are so ordered that they never too crudely contradict sensory
experience.   Instead, experience seems to justify them (cf. Winch 1964, p. 89)
It is interesting to me that the Zande's mystical notions are ordered so that they never too
crudely contradict sensory experience.  In that way the Zande are able to function in a world filled
with contradictions.  I believe that the Zande may not be too different from other rational animals in
this respect.  A rational animal has all sorts of beliefs.  Also, if he believes in the propositions, p, q, r,
s, and t, logic demands that he must believe in all the logical consequences of these propositions as
well.  The latter requirement imposes a structure on individual beliefs whose validity it is beyond the
intellectual capacity of  most people to check.  But if that is so, rational animals are likely to entertain
systems of beliefs that harbor oodles of contradictory propositions.  Most individuals probably cope20
with such contradictions in two ways.  They do not push their search for logical consequences too
far.  Also, when they run across contradictions, they are content to make local changes in their belief
systems.
II.3  Proper Premises for Choice and Judgements
We have seen that two rational animals in the same choice situation need not make the same
choices.  There are all sorts of reasons for that; e.g., differences in attitudes toward premises and the
use of different logics.  We have also seen that only when a person's logical arguments are fallacious,
do we have a good chance of persuading him to mend his ways.  In this section we shall see if it is
reasonable to believe that persons in the same society will make choices and pass judgements on the
basis of the same scientific and ethical principles.
Aristotle insisted that a rational animal's reasoning was true if it was logical and based on
premises that either were true by necessity or accepted as true by the wise.   Also, true reasoning
would result in good choices and judgements if it was activated by an appetition for the good.  In
Aristotle's days, a person's reasoning was logical only if it adhered to the  rules and regulations of
Aristotle's own syllogistic logic.  Today most people would insist that to be logical a person's
arguments would have to satisfy the strictures of the first-order predicate calculus (FPC).  However,
there are dissenters.  For example, in the FPC the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) is a
tautology.  In the formal logic of the Dutch intuitionists LEM is true in some cases and not in others.
Also, the FPC is monotonic in the sense that if C follows from A necessarily, then C follows by
necessity from A and B as well. The formal logic that artificial-intelligence people have developed for
choice with incomplete information is nonmonotonic.
For us it is useful to distinguish between logical premises and nonlogical premises.  Different
logics make use of different axioms and different rules of inference.  The mixture of axioms and rules
of inference  in a given formal logic may vary from one presentation to another.  Therefore, I shall
think of the rules of inference of a formal logic as premises on a par with the axioms of the same
logic.  Logical premises are premises that belong to some formal logic.  Two individuals who make21
use of different formal logics base their arguments on different families of logical premises.  It is
possible that one and the same person may make use of one formal logic in one situation and another
in a different situation.  In that case the family of logical premises that the person employs varies over
the situations he faces.  As long as the person keeps the different families of logical premises apart,
this variation need not involve him in contradictions.
I shall distinguish between two families of nonlogical premises.  One concerns scientific
matters.  The other deals with ethical matters.  The scientific principles are of two kinds, those that
are true by necessity and those that wise men have surmised from theory and from observations by
inductive and appropriate analogical reasoning.  The ethical premises are also of two kinds, those
that concern moral virtues and those that pertain to political science proper.
The  scientific premises that are true by necessity comprise a varied lot of assertions.   Some
of them are true by definition: e.g., "all widows have had husbands."  Others can be established by
analysis: e.g., "for all integers n, 1+2+…+n = n(n+1)/2."  Still others are intuitively obvious: e.g.,
"agricultural skill remaining the same, additional labour employed on the land within a given district
produces in general a less-than-proportionate return." Finally, there are some assertions for the truth
of which wise men provide both inductive and theoretical reasons: e.g.,  "any living organism has or
has had a parent."
The second class of scientific premises contains propositions that the wise, without good
theoretical reasons, believe to be true.  Some are laws that scientists have established by induction;
e.g., "all ruminants have cloven hooves."  Others are laws that can be inferred by analogy from
introspection or other pertinent observations; e.g., "any man is either in selfless persuit of some
spiritual goal or desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible."  Still others are
laws of nature that knowledgeable wise men, on rather flimsy evidence, take to be valid; e.g., John
M. Keynes’ Principle of the Limited Variability of Nature.
It is possible that in a given society there is a family of scientific premises that all the
members, if prodded, would accept as valid.  Still, the scientific premises on which one person in
the society bases his reasoning will vary over the situations he faces.  Also the scientific22
premises that different persons employ in similar situations are likely to differ for various
reasons.  Their educational background and their stock of tacit knowledge may differ.
Besides, their access to information retrieval systems may be very different. These facts of life
have interesting analogues in mathematics. In developing one and the same theory different
mathematicians may make use of different axioms and rules of inference.  Also what are axioms in
one theory may appear as theorems in another.  For example, the axioms of the theory of  real
numbers are derived theorems in set theory and universal theorems in Euclidean geometry.
The ethical premises that concern moral virtues are prescriptions for good behavior.  Some
describe what it is morally right to do; e.g., "you shall honor your mother and father."  Others list
actions that are morally wrong; e.g., "you shall not kill." Still others formulate general principles for
right behavior; e.g., "do to others only what you would like them to do to you."  Prescriptions for
good behavior as well as sanctions for bad behavior vary both with the codes of honor of secular
societies and with the commandments of  religious societies.  For example, a woman's bare ankle is
hardly noticed in the US. It is cause for a public beating in Taliban Afghanistan  Also, the
interpretation that different wise give to one and the same ethical premise may differ.  For example,
act-Utilitarians disagree with rule-Utilitatrians about whether one ever can justify lying about illicit
sexual relations.  Similarly, proponents of Natural-Law ethics disagree  with Utilitarians about
justifiable reasons for killing a fetus to save the mother's life.
The ethical premises that concern matters of political philosophy prescribe basic rights of
human beings and essential characteristics of a just society. Examples of fundamental human rights
are "freedom of thought and worship" and "freedom of speech and assembly." Examples of the
ingredients of a just society are "equality before the law" and "equality of opportunity."  Philosophers
agree that there are such things as fundamental human rights.  However they disagree as to whether
to look for the origin of  such rights in natural law or social-contract theory.  Philosophers are equally
at odds about how to characterize a just society.  For example, Aristotle accepted the subjugation of
women to men, slaves to citizens, and Barbarians to Helenes.  He reserved justice for those who
were "free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal" (the Nichomachian Ethics, pp. 106-
125).  In contrast, Rawls insists that a just society is a society in which equality of opportunity reigns
and in which each person has an equal claim to the basic rights and liberties.  In a just society social23
and economic inequalities will arise only if they contribute to the welfare of the least advantaged
members of society (Rawls 1971, pp. 54-83).
The ethical premises determine what is right or wrong in a person's relation to other human
beings.  They also structure a rational animal's appetition for the good.  It is quite clear that
different secular as well as religious societies will adopt different families of basic ethical
premises.  Still there may be a core of ethical premises that reasonable secular and religious
societies will accept so that their respective nations can survive as free democratic societies.
If such principles exist, we may find them among the  principles of justice that Rawls' reasonable and
rational persons in a Hobbesian Original State would adopt for a democratic society of free and
equal citizens.  These reasonable and rational persons, supposedly, have a sense of justice, a
conception of the good, and the intellectual powers of judgment, thought and inference.  Moreover,
in the Original State they search for principles of justice that specify fair terms of social cooperation
between free and equal citizens and ensure the emergence of just institutions in a democratic society.
Rawls believes that the resulting principles would enable even a society of individuals who are
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines to exist over time as a
just and stable society of free and equal citizens (Rawls, 1996, pp. 47-88).  There are in our social
reality examples of just and stable democratic societies with free and equal citizens.  Norway is one
of them,  I believe that Rawls' reasonable and rational persons would accept the principles that the
Norwegian constitution incorporates.  I also believe that it is fair to say that Norwegians today are
"profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines."  It will be interesting
to see how the tolerance of the doctrines fares as the population of African and Asian immigrants in
Norway grows.
II.4  Right Desires and Rational Choice in our Social Reality
           We have seen that it is possible that a given society may have a set of basic scientific
principles that all its members, if prodded, would consider valid.  Still, it is not certain that two of the
same society's members in a given choice situation would reason with the same basic principles.  We
have also seen that in a society in which members are at odds about fundamental religious,
philosophical and moral issues only the principles that concern poliitical justice have a good chance24
of being accepted by all.  But if that is so, there are better ways to think of a rational animal's proper
premises than to identify them with the basic principles we discussed above.  Here is one such way.
Scientific and ethical premises influence a rational animal's acts and judgements in interesting
ways.  To see how, take a second look at my examples.  Whatever are the scientific premises on
which a given person bases his acts and judgements, they express  facts.  Some of these originate in
scientific classifications and blue prints.  Others are determined by institutional constraints.  All of
them express factual aspects of the social reality which the person is experiencing.  Similarly,
whatever are the ethical premises on which a given person bases his acts and judgements, they and
the sanctions that the person associates with them determine institutional facts.  These institutional
facts also express factual aspects of the social reality which the person is experiencing.  Both the
scientific and the ethical premises vary with individuals and with the situations that different individuals
face.  For a given US farmer some of the premises may describe ways to produce pertinent farm
products.  Others may inform him how to rank the same products according to their profitability and
insist that he not employ illegal immigrants.  For a given physicist at CERN some of the premises may
instruct him how to read tracks in a cloud chamber.  Others may inform him how to report his results
and insist that he do it truthfully.
In the remainder of the paper we shall think of a person's basic principles
as facts in the social reality that he is experiencing.  Some of these facts he carries with him as
easily accessible explicit or tacit knowledge.  Others he can, if need be, acquire by reading books
and journals or simply by picking the brains of friends and foes.  The sentences that he, in virtue of
these facts, believes to be true may harbor contradictions.  They may also express facts that are not
accepted as facts by others,  In each choice situation he will make his decisions on the basis of
pertinent facts only.  If the latter harbor contradictions, and if he becomes aware of it, we expect that
he will make changes in his basic principles locally and, if possible, adjust his choice or judgement
accordingly.  The facts that determine a person's choice and judgements in a given situation
depend on the person's desires and vary with the situation he faces.
A person's desires are right if they reflect an appetition for the good.  In the history of
moral philosophy the 'good' has been interpreted to be many different things.  To Plato the 'good'25
was a form in a world of ideas whose reference in Plato's social reality consisted of all those things
that one truthfully could describe as 'good.'   To medieval Christian philosophers the 'good' was
God, and eternal life with God was the goal of  all right desires.  To nineteenth century Utilitarians the
'good' was the sum total of happiness that the members of a given population experienced, and
happiness was pleasure and freedom from pain. Here I shall give 'good' the interpretation that
Aristotle gave to the term  The 'good' is that at which every art and inquiry and every action
and pursuit aim.  Also the 'good' is something people search for its own sake.   Aristotle
identified  this 'good' with 'happiness', and I shall insist that the happiness in question is the 'good' that
any given individual experiences.  As such, happiness is an undefined term that economists usually
designate by 'utility.'
Aristotle insisted that the 'good' was an activity of the soul in accordance with moral and
intellectual virtues.  This connection between the 'good' and all the virtues that he listed in his
Nichomachean Ethics was an essential characteristic of Aristotle's idea of the 'good.'  We shall
obtain an analogous connection by insisting that happiness; i.e., the good is a function of variables
some of which we associate with Aristotle's virtues,  and some of which we associate with
members of Rawls' list of primary goods.  Examples are knowledge, esteem, friendship, justice,
basic rights and liberties, and income and wealth.  The function may but need not be additively
separable, and the arguments as well as the function itself may vary from one individual to the next.
Here it is important to observe that an appetition for the good may lead to increased values of some
factors affecting happiness and to decreased values of others.  Thus it is perfectly possible that the
act of a Norwegian who fails to pay a buss ticket and the act of a North Carolina business man who
sees fit to employ an illegal immigrant may reflect an appetite for the 'good.'
With the preceding observations in mind I can conclude this section with the following
characterization of rational choice and judgements:   Rational choices and judgements are good
choices and judgements that, in accordance with the rules of logic, follow by necessity from
pertinent facts and right desires.  The facts that determine a person's choice and judgement in a
given situation depend on the person's desires and vary with the situation he faces.26
III  Rationality in Economics
In Section I I insisted that a human being is a rational animal, and that a rational animal is an
animal with deliberative imagination who has beliefs and is able to opine and reason.  These rational
animals constitute the populations whose characteristics we study in econometrics.  In Section II  I
insisted that rational choices and judgements were good choices and judgements that followed by
necessity from pertinent facts and right desires.  The desires, supposedly, varied with persons and
the pertinent facts varied both with persons and with the situations that the persons faced.  To me this
characterization depicts characteristic features of the choices and judgements that members of the
populations we study in econometrics make.
In my characterization of rational choices and judgements the terms 'good choice,' 'good
judgement,' 'pertinent fact,' and 'right desire,'  are undefined terms.  Hence, the characterization
notwithstanding, 'rational choice' and 'rational judgement' have no definite meaning.  In econometrics
the latter terms are given interpretations that seem appropriate for the studies on hand.  Such
interpretations econometricians usually extract from various economic theories.  We shall now take a
close look at some of these interpretations and their empirical relevance.
III.1  Consumer Choice under Certainty
There are all sorts of economic theories that are relevant in this context.  Some pertain to
choice under certainty.  Others concern choice under uncertainty.  Still others delineate strategies in
various game-theoretic situations.  Economists use these theories to describe the behavior of
organizations as well as the behavior of individuals.  Econometricians can use them to search for
empirically relevant interpretations of the undefined terms in my characterization of rational choices
and judgements.
It is important to note that econometricians cannot use economic theories to test the
rationality of members of a given population.  The members are rational.  It is also the case that27
econometricians can never know from a priori reasoning alone in what situations a particular
economic theory might have empirical relevance.  This may sound strange.  So here is an example to
illustrate what I have in mind.
E.10  Consider my daily shopping for food in the neighborhood grocery store and the standard theory of
consumer choice under certainty.  I usually buy a loaf of bread and I might buy coffee if the price is right.  Some
times the store is out of my family's favorite brand of bread.  Then I buy another brand that I believe my little
daughter will like.  I will do that  even if the other brand costs twice as much, and even if there is another grocery
store, ten minutes away, that might have the brand I want.  As to coffee,  I will buy coffee only if I judge the price
to be low.  Then  I buy many more bags of coffee than I need, and I store them for later use.   The theory of
consumer choice insists that a rational consumer in each period chooses the commodity bundle that maximizes his
utility subject to his budget constraint.  This theory cannot be used to question the rationality of my shopping in
the neighborhood grocery store.  There are three good reasons for that.  The theory does not account for the
costs of search.  It provides no opportunity for storing goods.   And it denies current prices the ability to convey
information about future prices.
The moral of E.10 is not that the theory of consumer choice under certainty is wrong.
Instead it is that we must choose its applications with care.  Also, in searching for applications, we
must keep in mind that the main purport of the theory is to delineate two characteristic features of
consumer choice and exhibit how they are reflected in consumer behavior.  In this theory 'good
judgement' is taken to mean that the consumer can order the commodity bundles he faces.  Also
'good choice' means choosing among the available bundles the one the consumer ranks the highest.
In the intended interpretation of the theory, a consumer is an individual living alone or a family living
together and having a common budget.  A commodity bundle is an ordinary commodity vector.  It
may also be a vector of safe and risky assets or a life-cycle plan of consumer expenditures.  Finally,
an available commodity bundle is a commodity bundle that satisfies the budget constraint which the
consumer faces.   Econometricians have used the theory successfully to study how consumers'
expenditures on various categories of commodities vary with  their income (Engel, 1857 and Aasnes
et al, 1985).  They have also used it successfully to determine how a consumer's choice of safe and
risky assets varies with his net worth (Arrow, 1965 and Stigum, 1990), and how his consumption-
savings decision varies with his life-cycle income stream (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1955, Friedman,
1957, and Stigum, 1990).28
III.2  Choice under Uncertainty
Most economic theories of choice agree that 'good judgement'  is synonymous with 'ability to
rank available options.'  The characteristics of the rankings in question, however, vary over theories
as well as over the situations the decision maker faces.  A careful look at the theory of choice under
uncertainty will bear witness to that.
An uncertain option can be many things; e.g., a gamble, an insurance policy, or an investment
in the stock market.  We shall distinguish between two kinds of uncertain options - those that pertain
to risky situations and those that pertain to uncertain situations.  Here a risky situation is taken to
be a situation in which the likelihoods of all possible events are known or can be calculated by
reason alone. An uncertain situation is a situation in which the likelihoods of all possible events are
not known and cannot be calculated with reason alone.  I begin by discussing choice in risky
situations.
III.2.1  Risky Situations
To make my discussion of choice in risky situations as simple as possible I shall think of an
uncertain option in such situations as a prospect.  A prospect is an n-tuple of pairs,
{(x1,p1),...,(xn,pn)}, where xi ˛ R  is an outcome, pi˛ R+ is a measure of the likelihood of xi
happening, and  p1 + ....+ pn = 1.
Showing 'good judgement' in risky situations involves carrying out two successive tasks.  The
first task consists in assigning numbers to the pi in the prospects which the decision maker is facing.
That task is some times easy and other times not so easy.  Also, a given task may be easy for some
and much too difficult for others. Examples E.11 – E.12 below will illustrate what I have in mind.
According to Laplace, the probability of an event is the ratio of the number of cases that are
favorable to it, to the number of possible cases, when there is nothing to make us believe that one
case should occur rather than any other, so that the cases are, for us, equally likely (Laplace, 1951,29
pp. 6-7 and 11).  With this definition in mind and, if need be, with a little bit of coaching I should
think that most people would agree with the probability I assign  in E.11.
E.11  A blindfolded man, A, is to pull a ball from an urn with  k  red balls and (100-k) white balls.  The urn
is shaken well.  So the probability of A pulling a red ball from the urn is  k/100.
With coaching most people might be able to determine the probability of more complicated
events; e.g.,  the probability of  E1,  four red balls in four draws with replacement from an urn with  k
= 84, or  the probability of E2,  at least four red balls in ten draws with replacement from an urn with
k =  50.  However, without coaching it is unlikely that the majority of people would manage to figure
such probabilities.
D. Kahnemann and A. Tversky believe that most people in assessing likelihoods rely on a
limited number of heuristics which help them reduce complex computational tasks to manageable
proportions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972).  One such heuristic, anchoring, leads people to
overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and to underestimate the probability of disjunctive
events.  Thus chances are that most people would overestimate the probability of E1  and
underestimate the probability of E2. Much experimental evidence bears out this prediction (cf. for
example Bar-Hillel, 1973).
What untutered people might do in the case I describe in E.12 is anybody's guess.
E.12  Consider a mechanical system of r indistinguishable particles.  The phase space has been
subdivided into a large number n of cells so that each particle is assigned to one cell.  There are n
r different ways
in which r particles can be arranged in n cells.  I have no reason to believe that one way is more likely than
another,  So I take all ways to be equally likely.  Since there are  r!/r1!r2!...rn! indistinguishable ways in which we
can arrange r particles such that ri particles are in cell i, i=1,...,n, I conclude that the probability that cells 1,...,n
contain r1,...,rn particles with  r1 + ,,, + rn = r is (r!/r1!r2!...rn!)n
-r .
The interesting aspect of E.12 is that I have used Laplace's definition of probability correctly
and come up with a wrong probability assignment.  According to W. Feller, numerous experiments
have shown beyond doubt that the probabilities I calculated in E.12 are not the true probabilities of
any known mechanical system of particles.  For example, photons, nuclei, and atoms containing an30
even number of elementary particles behave as if they only considered distinguishable arrangements
of the pertinent system's particles.  Since there are just  (n+r-1)!/(n-1)!r! distinguishable
arrangements of r particles in n cells, and since all of them seem to be equally likely, the true
probability of the given event for photons, nuclei, and atoms containing an even number of
elementary particles is [(n+r-1)!/(n-1)!r!]
-1.
Few if any would question Feller's authority in E.12.  So from E.11 and E.12 we conclude
that we shall know only in trivial cases what are the prospects among which a given decision maker
chooses.  This is true even if we help him determine the values of the pertinent probabilities. The
values we assess may be very different from the values that the decision maker perceives.  For
example, the high probabilities may be higher than the corresponding perceived probabilities,  and
the low probabilities may be lower than the corresponding perceived probabilities.  Many
experimental studies bear witness to such a possibility (cf. for example Mosteller and Nogee, 1951
and Preston and Baratta, 1948).
To show 'good judgement' in risky situations the decision maker must carry out a second
difficult task:  determine his ordering of the prospects he faces.  For that purpose, consider a
decision maker, B, whose perceived probabilities often differ from the true probabilities in the
prospects he faces.   In a given situation a prospect is to B like a measurable function on a
probability space, (￿,￿,ˆ), where ￿ is a finite set of states of nature, ￿ is the field of all subsets of
￿, and ˆ is a probability measure. The functions take only a finite number of values all of which
belong to a set of real numbers, X, and the value of ˆ at  any  A˛ ￿ equals the likelihood of A
happening that B perceives.  Also, B's ordering of  the pertinent prospects induces an ordering of
functions in which B orders indicator functions of subsets of ￿ in accordance with the sets' ˆ-
values.  Finally, with a slight modification of axiom SSA 4 B's ordering of prospects satisfies the
axioms concerning ￿ and B's ordering of measurable functions that I listed in (Stigum, 1990, pp.
434-439).  That ensures the existence of a function, U(￿): X ﬁ R, that is determined up to a positive
linear transformation, and is such that if x and y are any two of the prospects B faces, B will prefer x
to y  if and only if
                                              ￿ h˛￿U(x(h))dˆ  >  ￿ h˛￿U(y(h))dˆ .31
Thus, if ￿ and B's ordering of measurable functions satisfy my axioms, B will order the pertinent
prospects according to their perceived expected utilities.
The theory of mine is controversial in several respects. My axioms represent a modification
of L.J. Savage's axioms for choice in risky situations (cf. Savage, 1954).  In Savage's theory ￿
contains a nondenumerable number of states of nature. Also, both the utility function and the
subjective probability measure of the decision maker are determined by his or her risk preferences.
Finally, Savage seems to believe that the utility function and the subjective probability measure are
determined once and for all for all the risky situations that the decision maker might face.  I believe
that  U(￿), ￿, and ˆ(￿) may vary from one choice situation to the next.  Also, in the situations I
envision above 'good judgement' is obtained sequentially in two steps.  We first determine B's
perceived probabilities and then his or her ordering of the prospects in question.  That allows me to
rephrase my SSA 4 axiom in the obvious way such that the ai in equation 19.22 on p. 435 of
(Stigum, 1990) can be interpreted as B's perceived probability of the i
th state of nature.
The empirical relevance of my theory is also uncertain.  To see why consider the following
example.
E.13  Consider an urn with 100 balls that differ only in color and assume that there are 89 red balls, 10
black balls, and 1 white ball.  The urn is shaken well and a blindfolded man is to pull one ball from it.  We ask a
decision maker, B, to rank the components of the following two pairs of prospects in which he will receive
                  a1:  $1000 regardless of which ball is drawn;
                  a2:  nothing, $1000, or $5000 according as the ball drawn is white, red, or black,
                  b1:  nothing if the ball is red and $1000 otherwise;
                  b2:   nothing if the ball is either red or white and $5000 if the ball is black.
If B's preferences satisfy my axioms, B will prefer  a1 to a2 if and only if he prefers b1 to b2 .  Also, B will prefer  a2
to a1 if and only if he prefers  b2 to b1.
Ever since Maurice Allais in 1952 started dreaming up examples like E.13 (cf. Allais, 1979),
numerous individuals have been asked to rank similar pairs of prospects.  Judging from the
experiments of which I am aware, roughly 60% of the subjects answer in accordance with the
prescriptions of my theory.  Those who "fail" the test usually prefer a1 to a2 and b2 to b1.  Their32
preferences seem to reveal an aversion to uncertainty that is characteristic of individuals who shade
their probabilities in uncertain situations.  More on that below.
III 2.2  Uncertain Situations
In discussing choice of options in uncertain situations we shall again, for simplicity, think of an
option as a prospect, {(x1,p1),...,(xn,pn)}.  In this case the xi are known, but the pi are not.  Also the
true values of the pi cannot be calculated by reason alone.  We shall consider two prominent ways of
dealing with such prospects.  In one of them the decision maker assigns values to the  pi in
accordance with Baysian principles and chooses among options according to their expected utility.
In the other the decision maker assigns values to the  pi in accordance with ideas that A. P.
Dempster and G. Shafer developed in (Dempster, 1967) and (Shafer, 1976).  Also, he chooses
among options according to the values of a Choquet integral that he associates with them.  I begin
with the Baysians.
Consider the following example, and take special note of the forty-five subjects who were
indifferent in their choice of urns.
E.14  Two urns, A and B, contain 100 balls that are either red or white.  There are 50 red balls in A, but
nobody knows how many there are in B.  A blindfolded man is to pull a ball from one of the urns, and you are to
choose the urn for him.  If he pulls a red ball, you will receive $100, otherwise nothing.  Of 140 colleagues,
students, and friends in Evanston and Oslo who were faced with the given choice, 82 chose A, 45 could not make
up their minds, and 13 chose B.
Each one of the 45 indifferent persons may have argued like true Baysians.  The probability of pulling
a red ball from A is 1/2.  Also, there are 101 possible combinations of  red and white balls in B, and
there is no reason why one combination is more likely than another. So, we should assign prior
probability  (101)
-1 to each of them and insist that the probability of picking a red ball in B equals
￿i=0
100 (i/100)￿(101)
-1 =  (101)
-1￿[100￿101/2￿100]  = 1/2.  If the Baysian arguments are right, there is
no reason to prefer one urn to the other.33
A Baysian prior is supposed to reflect the decision maker's knowledge about the pi in a given
prospect.  Assigning such priors can be problematic.  Here is a case in point.
.
E.15 Consider two deseases, X and Y, that require different treatments, and that are equally fatal if
untreated.  A person, A, is taking a test to determine whether he is suffering from X or Y.  He knows that the
probability that the test result will be accurate is  4/5.  He also knows that X for a variety of demographic reasons
is nineteen times as common as Y.  The test reports that A suffers from Y.  From this A deduces that the
probability is  4/23 that he is suffering from Y and 19/23 that he is suffering from X.  So he asks his doctor to treat
him for X.
I became aware of this example from reading an article of L. J. Cohen (Cohen, 1981, p.
329).  Cohen insists that A has used a prior concerning the relative prevalence of the two diseases
and computed the probability that an instance of a long run of patients that take the test will suffer
from disease X.  He should have used, instead, a prior that assesses A's own predisposition to the
two diseases.  If A has no known predisposition to either disease, he should have concluded from
the test results that the probability is  4/5 that he is suffering from Y and ask his doctor to treat him
for Y rather than X.  Results of experimental tests in comparable situations suggest  that subjects
tend to judge the values of the pertinent probabilities in the way Cohen suggests is right (cf. for
example, Hammerton, 1973).
We have seen above that learned people may disagree on what is the appropriate prior to
use in evaluating a given option.  It is also the case that Baysians argue among themselves what is the
best way to model ignorance.  They worry when their way of modeling ignorance of a parameter, p,
suggests that they are not that ignorant about the value of 1/p. Also they are concerned when use of
a diffuse prior to model ignorance of a parameter,q , may swamp the information that a researcher
can obtain from sample information about q .  For us the important thing to observe is that not
everybody is a Baysian - at most 45 of the 140 subjects in E.15  Also, even one who tends to think
like a Baysian will have difficulties calculating the posteriors that are required for proper use of
Baysian ideas.  Finally, however a Baysian chooses his priors and calculates his posteriors, both the
priors and the posteriors are honest probabilities.  They are nonnegative and their sums or their
integrals, as the case may be, equal 1.34
To see how  Baysians order prospects, consider a decision maker, D, who calculates the
probabilities in any prospect that he faces the way a Baysian would calculate them.  To D a prospect
x is like a probability distribution, Fx(￿): R ﬁ [0,1].  D's ordering of prospects induces an ordering of
such probability distributions.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern in (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1948) gave sufficient conditions on D's ordering of probability distributions that there exists a
function, U(￿): R ﬁ R, that is determined up to a positive linear transformation, and is such that if x
and y are any two prospects, D will prefer x to y if and only if
                                          ￿ U(t)Fx(dt) >  ￿ U(t)Fy(dt).
Thus if x = {(x1,p1),…,(xn,pn)}, y = {(y1,q1),…,(ym ,qm), and the pi and the qj are the probabilities
that D has calculated,  then D will prefer x to y if and only if
                             ￿i=1
n U(xi) pi    >   ￿j=1
m U(yj) qj  ;
i.e., if and only if the expected utility of x is larger than the expected utility of y.
M.  Allais and his followers are as critical of von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory as they
are of Savage's theory.  Also, many of the tests that they have conceived have been  good tests of
both theories (cf. MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979).  The dismal results of these tests have
motivated researchers to look for alternative theories.  We shall next discuss the most promising of
them.
Many knowledgeable persons will insist that the 82 subjects in E.16, by choosing A over B,
have revealed an aversion to uncertainty.  Specifically, so the argument goes.  For any one of these
subjects, we can find a number k < 50 and an urn, C(k), with k red balls and   (100-k) white balls
such that the given person would be indifferent between having the blindfolded man pull a ball from B
or C(k).  This indifference indicates that the person is assigning probability  (k/100)  to the event that
the blindfolded man might pull a red ball from B.  By a similar argument, he would assign probability
(k/100)  to the event that the blindfolded man might pull a white ball from B.  But if that is true, the
given subject is a person who reacts to uncertainty by shading his probabilities.  Chances are good
that the other members of the group of 82 in E.15 react to uncertainty in the same way.35
When people shade their probabilities, they assign superadditive probabilities to the possible
events in an uncertain situation.  Such probabilities have interesting properties.  To study them I
assume, for simplicity, that there are only a finite number of states of nature; i.e., that  ￿ =
{h1,…,hn} for some n.  Also, I take ￿ to be the set of all subsets of  ￿, and I let Bel(￿): ￿ ﬁ [0,1]
be a function that records the values that a given decision maker, D, assigns to the subsets of  ￿. D
shades his probabilities in the face of uncertainty.  Hence, for any two disjoint events, A and C, we
find that Bel(A) + Bel( C) £ Bel(A¨C).  Finally, I assume that there exists a function, m(￿): ￿ ﬁ
[0,1], with m(˘) = 0,  ￿A￿￿ m(A) = 1, and Bel(A) =          ￿C￿A m(C ) for all A ˛ ￿.
In his book Shafer develops interesting ways for D to combine belief functions so as to
update his beliefs.  However, he has little to say about how D should order the options he faces.
There are several alternatives (cf. Jean-Yves Jaffray, 1989, Chateauneuf, 1986, and Gilboa, 1987).
I shall use a method that I once learned from Kjell Arne Brekke in 1986 (cf. Stigum,1990, pp. 445-
455).  Let ￿, ￿, Bel(￿),and m(￿) be as above, and think of a prospect as a function, x(￿): ￿ ﬁ X,
where X = {x1,…,xn} is the set of all consequences of the prospects that our decision maker, D,
faces.  I assume that D orders consequences according to the values of a function, U(￿): X ﬁ R.
Also, for each prospect, x(￿), and every A ˛ ￿, I let  Wx(A) =  minh˛A U(x(h))   Finally, I insist that
the utility which D receives from prospect x(￿)  equals V(x), where
                                  V(x) =  ￿A￿￿ Wx(A)m(A).
The ordering of prospects that V(￿) induces has many interesting characteristics. The ordering
cannot be rationalized by an expected utility index.  Instead,
                V(x) =  ￿0
￿ Bel({h˛￿: U(x(h))‡t}) dt,
where the integral reduces to an expected utility index only when Bel(￿) is additive.  Also, the
ordering exhibits a remarkable aversion to uncertainty that we can document in the following way.
Let
                         P = {p(￿): ￿ ﬁ [0,1]: ￿i=1
n p(hi ) = 1} and,36
for each  p˛P, let Pp(￿): ￿ ﬁ [0,1] be such that  Pp(A) = ￿h˛A p(h)  for each A ˛ ￿.  Also, let
                           C = {p˛ P: for all A ˛ ￿, Pp(A)‡Bel(A)].
Then
                                    V(x) = minp˛C ￿i=1
n U(x(hi))p(hi).
Finally, the ordering satisfies neither Savage's axioms nor mine.  The following example bears witness
to that.
E.16  Suppose that we ask an individual, Peter, to rank the components of the two pairs of prospects that
we described in E.15.  Peter lets ￿ = {h1,…,h100} and insists that  hi   is the name of a red, black, or white ball
according as 0< i £89, 90£ i £99, and i = 100, respectively.  Moreover, he lets the set of consequences, X,  be {0,
$1000, $5000 }, and notes that his utility function on X is given by U(0) = 0, U($1000) = 0.85, and U($5000) = 1.
Finally, Peter decides for himself that the expression, "the urn is shaken well," is vague and assigns the following
basic probabilities to the subsets of ￿:  M(A) = 0.7, 0.2, and 0.02  according as A is the set of red, black, and
white balls, respectively.  Also,  M(A) = 0.05, 0.03, and 0.01 according as A is the set of balls that are,
respectively, either red or black, either red or white, and either black or white.  In all other cases  M(A) = 0.  Now,
Peter ranks prospects in accordance with the values of the function V(￿) that his U(￿) and his m(￿) determine.
Therefore, he needs little time to figure that  V(xa2) <  V(xa1)   and that  V(xb1)  <  V(xb2 ).  Peter's ranking of  a1 and
a2  and of  b1 and  b2  violates the prescriptions of mine and Savage's theory.
III.3  Game-Theoretic Situations
In Consumer Choice under Certainty the consumer knows the values of all relevant current
and future prices.  In Consumer Choice under Uncertainty the consumer knows all relevant current
and past prices and he uses the information they convey to form his ideas about the probability
distributions of future prices (cf. Stigum, 1969 and Stigum, 1990, pp.  765- 800).  In both theories
the consumer forms his judgements and makes his choices independently of the judgements and
choices of other consumers.  In particular, he does not take into account that his ability to implement
his choices depends on the choices of other consumers.  Various sufficient conditions on preferences
and expectations that ensure the existence of prices at which all consumers can implement their
choices exist. The reader can find examples of such conditions for the certainty case in (Debreu,
1959).  Analogous conditions for the uncertainty case are given in (Stigum, 1969 and 1972).37
In game-theoretic situations each participant has on hand a set of pure strategies and faces a
set of consequences each member of which results from the particular combinations of pure
strategies that the participants choose.  Also, each participant orders consequences according to the
values of a utility function and may use mixed as well as pure strategies.  Finally, each participant
knows the rules of the game, knows his own and his opponents’ sets of pure strategies, knows the
consequences for him and the others of his and their choice of strategies, knows his own utility
function, and knows the families of functions to which his opponents’ utility functions belong.  Game
theorists usually add to this that it is common knowledge among participants that each participant
possesses such knowledge.
There are all sorts of games.  Some are non-cooperative.  Others are cooperative.  Some
are static.  Others are dynamic.  Whatever the pertinent game is, the novel aspect of a game-
theoretic situation is that each participant in his search of good choices must take into account the
possible choices of his opponents.  Game theorists agree that a good choice of strategy for a given
player must be a best response to the strategies of his opponents.  However, it is often hard to
determine what constitutes a best response in situations in which an opponent’s choice of strategy is
not well defined.  Also, even in situations where all the participants' best responses are common
knowledge, it may be impossible for a participant to single out a good choice of strategy before he
knows what his opponents will do.  I shall use the following example of a non-cooperative static
game to illustrate what I have in mind.
E.17  Consider a game with two players, A and B, in which A has four pure strategies, a,b,c, and d,  B has
three pure strategies, a,b, and g, and the payoff matrix is as follows:
                                                                               B’s strategies
                                                                    a                    b                     g
                                               a              150, 60            30, 200          150, 50
                                               b              200, 75            40, 300          100, 50
            A’s strategies             c                50, 300         200, 65            100, 30
                                              d               100,50            100, 45            100, 30
Thus if A chooses b and B chooses g, A will receive utility 100 and B will receive utility 50.38
            We take for granted that A and B are rational animals and that that is part of the players' common
knowledge.  A rational animal in B's situation would never choose g since the utilities he may receive from g are all
smaller than the respective utilities that he can obtain by choosing a or b.  Also, if B will never choose g, then a
rational animal in A's situation will never choose a since he can obtain higher utilities by choosing b.
Consequently, we can without loss in generality reduce A and B's game to a game where A has three strategies,
b,c, and d, B has two strategies, a and b, and the payoff matrix is as follows:
                                                                      B’s strategies
                                                                  a                           b
                                              b             200, 75                   40, 300
            A’s strategies            c                50, 300                200, 65
                                             d              100, 50                  100, 45
            In the last description of the game B’s best responses to A’s pure strategies, b, c, and d, are b, a, and b,
respectively.  Similarly, A's best responses to B’s pure strategies, a and b, are b and c, respectively.  Also, the
utility that A can gain from playing d is smaller than the expected utility that he would obtain by playing b with
probability 1/2 and c with probability 1/2.  So most game theorists would insist that a rational animal in A's
situation would never play d.  However, this need not be so.   Unless it is common knowledge that players in a
game rank uncertain prospects according to their expected utility, we cannot take for granted that A will never
employ d.  More on that below.
A Nash equilibrium in a game is a combination of strategies in which each participant has played his best
response against the chosen strategies of the other players.  In the given game there is no Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.  If it is common knowledge that A and B rank uncertain options according to their expected utility,
there is, instead, a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.  In this equilibrium A plays b with probability 47/92 and c
with probability 45/92 and B plays a with probability 16/31 and b with probability 15/31.  There is no other Nash
equilibrium.
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There are many interesting aspects of the preceding example.  For example, a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies is an equilibrium in which each participant in the game, after having
learned to know the strategies his opponents chose, is satisfied with the strategy he chose for himself.
A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is nothing of the sort, since in such an equilibrium the game
participants shall never know what strategies their opponents have adopted.  Game theorists seek to
ameliorate this deficiency by adding two conditions to our characterization of games.  They insist that
it must be common knowledge that each participant is ‘rational’ and that 'rational' individuals limit
their choice of good strategies to Nash equilibrium strategies.  In a game with a unique Nash
equilibrium, therefore, the players need not observe the strategies of their opponents.  They can39
calculate the strategies of their opponents and choose their own strategies accordingly.  What the
participants are supposed to do in games with multiple Nash equilibria, however, is problematic to
say the least.
It is one thing to argue that it is 'rational' for the players of a game to adopt mutually
consistent Nash equilibrium strategies.  It is another thing to insist that in game-theoretic situations
rational animals tend to choose mutually consistent Nash equilibrium strategies.  The former is an
assertion about what rational animals ought to do when they participate in games.  The latter is an
assertion about what rational animals actually do.  Game theorists’ arguments in support of Nash
equilibrium strategies make wonderful sense for a normative theory of games.  However, they are
of little help in the search for ways to develop a positive theory of games.  To describe actual
behavior in games we must introduce new ideas.
From the point of view of a positive theory of games it is awkward to insist that players are
“rational’ and that ‘rational’ players always choose Nash equilibrium strategies.  Players are rational
animals, but it is far from evident that rational animals necessarily choose Nash equilibrium strategies.
To describe the behavior of rational animals in game-theoretic situations, we must introduce ideas
about the players’ expectations and about their risk preferences.  To see how, take another look at
the game in E.17.  From the point of view of A, his three pure strategies are three prospects with
known consequences  and unspecified probabilities.  The probabilities specify A’s  ideas as to how
B goes about choosing his two strategies.  Similarly, to B his two strategies are prospects with
known consequences and unspecified probabilities.  The probabilities describe B’s ideas as to how
A goes about choosing his three strategies.  A and B must use the information they possess about
each other to evaluate the pertinent probabilities, rank the resulting prospects, and determine their
respective good choices.  A’s and B’s probability assignments and risk preferences are not common
knowledge.  The next example elaborates on these ideas.
E.18  Consider the game in E.17 without the dominated strategies, and assume that both A and B assign
probabilities to the strategies of their opponent in accordance with the principles of Dempster and Shafer.  A
argues that B has no good reason for preferring a to b.  So he assigns the following basic probabilities to B’s
choice of strategies:
                              mA({a}) = ¼ = mA({b}) and mA({a,b}) = ½.40
B on his side argues that A has no good reason for preferring  b to c and that there is a chance that A is averse to
uncertainty.  So he assigns the following basic probabilities to A’s choice of strategies:
          mB({b}) = ¼ = mB({c}), mB({b,c)) = ¼, mB({d}) = 1/6, and mB({b,c,d}) = 1/12.
Also, both A and B in uncertain situations rank their prospects according to the prescriptions of Kjell Arne
Brekke that I detailed above.  Thus, for A we find that
         WA({a}|b) = 200, WA({b}|b) = 40, WA({a,b}|b) =40, and VA(b) = ¼( 200+40) + ½ 40= 80;
        WA({a}|c) = 50, WA({b}|c) = 200, WA({a,b}|c) = 50, and VA(c ) = ¼(50+200) + ½ 50= 87.5; and
                      WA({a}|d) = 100,  WA({b}|d) = 100, WA({a,b}|d) = 100, and  VA(d) = 100.
For B we find that
         WB ({b}|a) = 75, WB ({c}|a) = 300, WB({d}|a) = 50, WB({b,c}|a) = 75, WB({b,c,d}|a) = 50; and
         WB({b}|b) = 300, WB({c}|b) = 65, WB({d}|b) = 45, WB({b,c}|b) = 65, WB({b,c,d}|b) = 45 with
                            VB(a) = ¼(75+300+75) + 1/6 50 + 1/12 50 = 1500/12 = 125, and
                            VB(b) = ¼(300+65+65) + 1/6 45 + 1/12 45 = 1425/12 = 118.75.
From this we conclude that A will choose strategy d, and that B will choose strategy a.  Neither one of them has
reasons to regret their choices. This solution shows why A's d strategy in the E 3.8-game cannot be eliminated
unless it is common knowledge that A is an expected utility maximizer.
The game-theoretic situations we considered above are prototypes of a little part of the game
situations we face in economics.  In other cases we must consider the possibility of preplay
communication, the strategic aspects of threats, and the advantages of cooperation.  Economists
have devised all sorts of theoretical models to go with such possibilities.  Some are easy to grasp and
others are quite fancy.  Here the important thing to notice is that the rationality that these theoretical
models prescribe need not have much in common with the rationality of rational animals.  The
empirical relevance of the characteristics of rational choice in these models must be confronted with
data before we can accept them.  I shall give two examples to illustrate what I have in mind.
A long time ago, 1950, John Nash insisted that any solution of a two-person bargaining
problem must satisfy four, supposedly, reasonable conditions:  Pareto-optimality, symmetry,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and invariance to linear transformations of utility.  Ingenious
experiments in economic laboratories have demonstrated that most experimental bargaining
outcomes satisfy the first three conditions and fail to satisfy the fourth (cf. Davis and Holt, 1993, pp.
242-275).  The failure of the fourth condition is problematic for game theorists who insist that it is
common knowledge in games that players rank mixed strategies according to their expected utility.41
The utility function of an expected-utility maximizer is determined up to a positive linear
transformation.
Multistage games usually have many Nash equilibria.  Multiple equilibria are problematic for
a positive theory of games, and have led game theorists to look for refinements of Nash equilibria.
One such refinement is Reinhard Selten’s idea of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the
players’ strategies establish Nash equilibria in each and every subgame (cf. Selten, 1965).  Subgame
perfect Nash equilibria have interesting characteristics one of which is that they rule out noncredible
threats off the equilibrium path.  They also carry with them intriguing questions for rational choice in
multi-stage games.  Here is why.  In any given case we find Selten’s equilibria by so-called
backward induction, and backward induction arguments are questionable.  A number of laboratory
experiments have demonstrated that subjects are not good at backward induction (cf. Davis and
Holt, 1993,    pp. 102-109).  Also, as evidenced by Selten’s own ‘chain-store paradox,’ they can
lead to unreasonable equilibria.  Finally, one aspect of rational choice, on which Selten insists, is
dubious:  If your opponent makes a draw that seems foolish to you, do not question his rationality!
Leading game theorists agree that such advice is controversial, and some of them are looking hard
for a concept of rationality that will rescue the backward induction argument (cf. Asheim,1999).
IV  Modeling Rationality in Econometrics
Aspects of rational choice surface in econometrics in two very different ways.  We find ideas
of rationality in the models that econometricians estimate.  These ideas usually originate in the
economic theories on the basis of which the models are constructed.  Notions of rational choice also
enter the way econometricians choose their strategies in the game-theoretic situations they face.  The
games econometricians play are of two kinds.  There are games ‘against’ the profession in which an
econometrician’s academic success is at stake.  Besides, there are games ‘against’ Nature in which
econometricians search for strategies that will minimize their expected losses.  In this section we shall
discuss both how econometricians model rationality.  How they choose good strategies in game-
theoretic situations will be the topic of Section V.42
From our discussion of rational animals and rationality in economics it follows that we cannot
put stringent requirements on the characteristics of rational animals’ good choices. We can insist that
in a given choice situation a rational animal will rank available alternatives and choose one that he
ranks the highest.  We can probably also insist that a rational animal in similar choice situations will
make the same choices.  If we insist on more than that, we are likely to find that there are sample
populations in which these requirements have little empirical relevance.
As we have seen, the preceding facts do not deter economists from imposing severe
requirements on rational choice in the situations that they consider.  The requirements on which
economists insist find their way into the models of individual behavior that econometricians construct.
I shall show how in two different cases, rational consumers and rational expectations in
macroeconomics.
IV.1  Rational Consumers
In the theory of consumer choice under certainty the consumer ranks commodity bundles
according to the values of a utility function. The available bundles are the ones that satisfy the
consumer’s budget constraint.  And the consumer’s good choice is the commodity bundle that
among all available bundles maximizes his utility.  The theory’s demands on rational behavior come
as a consequence of the conditions it imposes on the domain and functional characteristics of the
utility function.  For example, suppose that we identify a commodity bundle with a vector in R+
n and
assume that the utility function, U(.), is real valued, continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-
concave with domain R+
n.  Then we can show that the consumer’s choice of commodity bundles, x,
varies with his total expenditure, c, and with the commodity prices he faces, p, in accordance with
the values of a well defined vector-valued function, f(.): R++
n·R+ ﬁ R+
n.  The function, f(￿), is the
consumer's demand function.  It is (cf. Stigum, 1990, pp.184-189 ) continuous, homogeneous of
degree zero, and satisfies three interesting conditions:  Samuelson’s Fundamental Theorem of
Consumer Choice, Houthakker’s Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference, and
(i)                   pf(p,c) = c.43
If we add the assumption that U(.) is twice differentiable, we can deduce that almost everywhere in
R++
n · R+ the ith and jth component of f(.) satisfy the equations,
(ii)                 ¶fi(p,c)/¶pi + fi(p,c)¶fi(p,c)/¶c  <  0 for i = 1,...,n; and
(iii)           ¶fi(p,c)/¶pj + fj(p,c)¶fi(p,c)/¶c = ¶fj(p,c)/¶pi + fi(p,c)¶fj(p,c)/¶c for 1£i,j£n.
We can also show that, where the derivatives exist,
(iv)         the n·n Slutzky matrix, [¶fi(p,c)/¶pj + fj(p,c)¶fi(p,c)/¶c], is negative semi-definite.
The preceding restrictions on a consumer's good choices enter in various ways the models of
individual behavior that econometricians build.  Some econometricians assume that the pertinent
utility functions belong to a certain class of functions and derive explicit expressions for the
components of f(￿).  Their demand functions will satisfy conditions (i)-(v) by construction.
Unfortunately, the known classes of utility functions from which we can derive explicit expressions
for f(￿) are rather limited.  Also, their members yield demand functions that, in addition to satisfying
conditions (i)-(v), have properties that seem arbitrary and of little empirical relevance.
E.19  Consider the Klein-Rubin utility function,
          log U(x) =  ￿i=1
nbi log(xi - gi), where xi > gi, gi ‡ 0, bi > 0, and ￿i=1
nbi = 1.
The corresponding demand function,
                    Fi(p,c) = (bi/￿j=1
nbj)([c - ￿j=1
npjgj ]/pi) +  gi , i = 1,...,n
satisfies conditions (i)-(v) above for p > 0 and  c > ￿j=1
npjgj.  In addition, it has a  Slutzky matrix whose off-
diagonal elements are all positive.  The latter property has probably little empirical relevance.
Other econometricians formulate systems of demand functions the estimated versions
of which they believe will approximate arbitrarily closely the true demand function.  This can
be done in several ways.  Here is one of them:  Consider a twice differentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly quasi-concave utility function, U(￿), the associated demand function, f(￿), and the cost function,
(v)           C(u,p) = min{px: x˛R+
n, and U(x) ‡ u}, u ˛ range of U(￿), and p ˛ R++
n.44
We can show that C(￿) is (1) continuous and almost everywhere twice differentiable in (u,p),  (2)
increasing in u, and (3) nondecreasing, homogeneous of degree one, and concave in p.  Moreover, if
we let c = C(u,p) and solve the equation for u to get u as a function of c and p,
u = U
M(c,p), we can show that U




and that, whenever the pertinent derivatives exist,
 
)  (vii)               wi  = pifi(c,p)/c = ¶log C(u,p)/¶log pi , i=1,...,n.
(viii)              wi = pifi(c,p)/c = - (¶U
M(c,p)/¶log pi )/(¶U
M(c,p)/¶ log c), i=1,...,n.
Now, it is a fact that if a function, C(￿): R+ · R++
n ﬁ R+, has the properties we ascribed to
the cost function above, there is a twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave
utility function, U(￿): R+
n ﬁ R+, relative to which C(￿) is a proper cost function.  This and equation vii
above suggest an interesting way to generate approximate demand functions:  Delineate a family of
functions, {C
a(￿): a˛some index set,`}, the members of which can be used to approximate a cost
function, C(￿), in a neighborhood of any given pair, (u,p) ˛ domain of C(￿), and proceed to estimate
the pertinent version of
(ix)          wi = ¶log C
a(￿)/¶log pi , i=1,...,n.
E.20  A good example of this procedure is Angus Deaton and John Muelbauer's generation of their
Almost Ideal Demand  System (AIDS) (cf. Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980).  They delineate the family of
approximating functions by the equations,
(x)  log C
a(u.p) = u log b(p) + (1-u) log a(p), u ˛ [0,1], and p ˛ R++
n,
(xi)  log a(p) = a0 + ￿i=1
nai log pi + (1/2) ￿i=1
n ￿j=1
n gij
* log pi log pj , and
(xii)  log b(p) = log a(p) + b0Pi=1
n pi
bi .
  From these equations they derive the following version of equation (ix):
(xiii)  wi = ai + bi log (c/P) + ￿j=1
n gij log pj , where
(xiv)  log (P) = a0 + ￿i=1
n ai log pi + (1/2) ￿i=1
n ￿j=1
n gij log pi log pj45




  An approximating function need not have all the properties of the function it approximates.
The C
a(￿) of Deaton and Muellbauer satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of a cost function.  They also
satisfy the homogeneity requirement in (3) if we insist that
 
  (xv)                   ￿i=1
n ai = 1;  ￿i=1
n ￿j=1
n gij = 0; and  ￿i=1
n bi = 0.
 
  However, they need not be everywhere nondecreasing and concave in p. With the restrictions (xvi)
below added to equations (xv),
 
  (xvi)                                  ￿k=1
ngij = 0, i = 1,...,n,
(xv) 
the share equations that Deaton and Muellbauer's C
a(￿) generate are homogeneous of degree zero
and satisfy conditions (i) and (iii) above.  However, they need not satisfy condition (ii). Hence their
Slutzky matrix need not be negative semi-definite.  Also, for large enough c, the estimated versions of
the share equation, (xiii), will violate the conditions,
(xvii)          wi ˛ [0,1],  i = 1,...,n.
The preceding observations imply that the share equations in (xiii) cannot be used in a
theory-data confrontation to test the theory of consumer choice.  That fact has prompted many
econometricians to look for alternatives to Deaton and Muelbauer's AIDS.  R. Cooper and K.
McLaren are two of them (cf. Cooper and McLaren, 1996). They claim that it is not necessary to
generate estimable functions that satisfy the conditions of the consumer demand functions
everywhere.  For example, the demand function of the Klein-Rubin consumer satisfies the required
conditions only in the region, p > 0 and  c > ￿i=1
n pigi.  Also the estimated share equations in (xviii)
will satisfy the conditions in (xxii) for all (c,p) in the sample.  Such observations suggest to Cooper
and McLaren that it suffices to look for families of generating functions that produce functions the
estimated versions of which should have the characteristics of demand functions at all pairs, (c,p) in a46
given sample.  The empirical relevance of the theory will then depend on the estimated functions
having the required properties.
E.21  One of the families of generating functions that Cooper and McLaren have described is the
following family of indirect utility functions,
(xvii)  U
M(c,p) = ([(c/kP1)
m - 1]/m) • (c/P2)
h .
Here 0£h£1, m ‡ -1, k > 0, and Pj(p), j=1,2, are two price indexes that are continuous, homogeneous of degree one,
nondecreasing and concave and satisfy the condition,
(xviii)        Pj(1) = 1, and Pj(p) > 0 for p ˛ R++
n , j = 1,2.
The members of this family have all the properties of an indirect utility function in the region,                       {(c,p): c
> kP1(p)}.  The demand functions that the members generate satisfy conditions (i)-(v) in the same region.  If the
theory is correct, then the estimated versions of these demand functions should also have the required properties
at all points in the sample.
IV.2  Rational Expectations
            Consumer expectations play no role in the theory of consumer choice under certainty.  As a
consequence, expectations have no representation in most econometric models of consumer choice.
That is disconcerting in as much as expectations in the theory of consumer choice under uncertainty
play havoc with many of the theorems that we have recanted above.  For example, both Samuelson's
Fundamental Theorem (condition (iv) above) and Houthakker's Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preference are invalid.  The semi-definiteness of the Slutzky matrix (condition (v) above) is also
suspect.   The reader can find details concerning these matters in my 1969 article on "General
Equilibrium under Uncertainty" and in chapter 30 of Stigum, 1990.
We encounter expectations in econometrics both in the form of an adaptive expectations
hypothesis and in the form of a rational expectations hypothesis.  Here we shall discuss the latter.  In
1961 John Muth suggested that we consider individual decision makers' expectations to be informed
predictions of future events that coincide with the predictions of the relevant economic theory.  In
doing that we could ensure that our theories' descriptions of individual behavior would be consistent
with the pertinent decision makers' beliefs about the behavior of the economic system.  Muth's idea
of expectations formation constitutes the essential ingredient of the Rational Expectations
Hypothesis (REH) in econometrics.47
In the 1970's the REH surfaced in macroeconomic studies of inflation and the natural rate of
unemployment.  Economists observed that it was in the best interests of workers to be able to
predict the rate of inflation as well as possible.  To be successful in doing that the workers needed to
take into account all available information, including forecasts of changes in monetary and fiscal
policies.  Such information notwithstanding, individual workers might not make accurate assessment
of probable changes in the price level and different individuals were likely to make different forecasts.
Still, so economists hypothesized, on the average the workers' predictions would be right.  Also the
mistakes which the workers as a group made in forecasting the rate of inflation would be random and
uncorrelated with the information they possessed.  These ideas find expressions in the
macroeconomic model I  describe in E 3.13   I have learned of the model from Hashem Pesaran
who ascribes it to Robert E. Lucas (cf. Pesaran, 1987, pp. 26-29)..
E.22  Suppose that the behavior over time of an economy can be described by the following system of
equations:
(1)  yt
d + pt = mt + v, t= 1,2,...
(2)  yt
s - ÿ = a(pt - pt
*) + et , t = 1,2,...
                         (3)            yt
s = yt
d , t = 1,2,...
Here y
d , y
s , and ÿ are the logarithms , respectively, of the demand (for), supply, and natural level of aggregate
output.  Also, p and p* are the logarithms, respectively, of the actual price level and the price level that the
members of the economy in one period expected to prevail the next period.  Finally, m and v are the logarithms,
respectively, of the money supply and the velocity of money, t records pertinent periods, and {et ; t=1,2,...}
constitutes a purely random process with mean zero and finite variance.
Suppose next that m is an exogenous policy variable and adopt the rational expectations hypothesis that,
for each t, pt* equals the economic system's best prediction of the value of pt in period t-1.  By solving equations
(1)-(3) for pt we find that
(4)         pt = (a/(1+a)) pt
* + (1/(1+a)) (mt + v - ÿ - et).
Also. by taking expectations of both sides of (4) conditional on the information set in period  t-1, Wt-1 , we find
that the best predictor of pt, þt , is given by the equation,
(5)         þt = (a/(1+a)) pt
* + (1/(1+a)) E{mt + v - ÿ - et| Wt-1},
It follows from (5) and the REH that
(6)         pt* = E{mt + v - ÿ - et| Wt-1}.
If we now combine (6) and (4) and take expectation of both sides in (4) with respect to Wt-1, we can conclude that
                         (7)          E{pt | Wt-1} = E{mt + v - ÿ - et| Wt-1},
and hence that
                         (8)          pt* = E{pt|Wt-1}.48
The last equation shows that the price expectations of the members of the economy are valid on the average.
Also, since E{pt - pt*| Wt-1} = E{pt| Wt-1} - pt*  = 0, the equation implies that the prediction error in one period is
uncorrelated with the variables in the preceding period's information set.
E.22 gives a good idea of the role the REH plays in macroeconomic models.  In reading the
example the reader ought to note the severe knowledge requirements that the hypothesis places on
the members of the economy.  They are supposed to know both the true structural model of the
economy and the data generating process (DGP) of endogenous and exogenous variables alike.
In E.22 we did not characterize the  DGP of the exogenous variables.  One way to
accomplish that is to assume that the mt and the et in equations (1) and (2) satisfy the following set of
equations:
(9)        mt = rmt-1 +  xt , t=1,2,...,
where r ˛ (0,1), and  {xt:t=1,2,...} is a purely random process with mean zero and finite variance
that is distributed independently of the et .
(10)       E{et|Wt-1} = E{xt| Wt-1} = 0 , t=1,2,...
When we add equations (9) and (10) to (1)-(3), we can show that
(11)       yt = ÿ + (1/(1+a))(axt - et), t= 1,2,..., and
(12)       pt = rmt-1 + v - ÿ + (1/(1+ a))(xt - et), t = 1,2,... .
Thus, if the postulates, (1) - (3) and (9) -(10) are valid, it follows from equation (11) that only
unforeseen changes in the money supply affect the equilibrium level of y.  Also, equation (12)
provides an explicit form for the linear best predictor of the price level.
In all likelihood there are few rational animals with the kind of knowledge that the REH
requires in macroeconomics.  It is, therefore, interesting that in financial markets and in markets for49
foreign exchange the arbitrage activities of a small number of knowledgeable traders might suffice to
bring about rational expectations equilibria.  Supposedly, so economists argue, in their pursuit of
profits the knowledgeable traders will push their arbitrage activities to the point where the errors in
their forecasts of the rate of return on holding securities or foreign exchange are uncorrelated with the
information they possess.  The next example illustrates the dynamics of a market for shares in rational
expectations equilibrium.
E.23  Consider the shares of some US Company, and let Pt and dt+1, respectively, denote the price of a
share at the beginning of period t and the dividends per share that the company pays at the end of period t.  Also,
let zt+l denote the rate of return on holding a share during period t.  Then zt+1 = [dt+1 + (Pt+1 – Pt)]/ Pt.
Next, let yt+1 and lt, t = 0,1,… , respectively, be a vector of rates of return on holding a  share in each of n
different US companies during period t and the vector of the market’s best prediction of the values of the
components of yt+1 at the beginning of period t.  Also, let
                       ht+1 = yt+1 - lt, t = 0,1,… ,
and assume that the random process, {ht: t=1,2…} is an orthogonal wide-sense stationary process that satisfies
the conditions,
                E{ht+1|yt,…,y0} = 0, t = 0,1,… , and  E{ht| yt,…,y0} = ht, t = 1,2,… .
Finally, let j be an n·n matrix whose eigenvalues have absolute value less than 1; let yt+1
edenote investors’
expectations of the value of yt+1 at the beginning of period t; and assume that
                                     yt+1
e = yt + j(yt – yt
e), t =0,1,….
If we now let I be n·n identity matrix and insist that l0 = (I+j)y0 , we can invoke the REH,
                              lt = yt+1
e, t = 0,1,2,… ,
and deduce from the preceding equations that
                      yt+1 = ￿0£s£t (-j)
s(I+j)yt-s + ht+1, t = 0,1,2,…, and
                                  yt+1 = yt + ht+1 + jht, t = 0,1,2,… ..
We can also show that the components of  yt are cointegrated if the rows of j are linearly dependent.
V  Rational Choice in Econometrics
Econometricians make choices in all sorts of situations.  In some of them they choose among
possible research projects.  In others they single out good ways to solve the analytical problems that50
come with the chosen projects.  In still others they decide on how to present their results and where
to publish them.  We shall see what are the characteristics of rational choice in these situations.
V.1  Research Projects
A project is a plan or a proposal.  In econometrics a research project is an undertaken that
involves a concerted effort to solve a theoretical problem or to carry out an empirical analysis.  The
theoretical problem may be a problem in mathematical statistics or a problem in economic theory.
Examples are the asymptotic properties of a test statistic and the salient properties of an aggregate
production function.  The empirical analysis may consist in establishing the empirical relevance of a
given theory, providing economic forecasts for government policy makers, or giving a scientific
explanation of regularities that certain data display.  There are many other possibilities.
In choosing among research projects an econometrician must take into account his own
technical expertise and the ideas about which he would like to learn.  He must also consider the
availability of data and funding, and the possible use of collaborators.  Finally, he must take into
account various strategic aspects that concern his career; e.g., the general interest of each project,
the required time for their completion, and his tenure situation.  Certainly, it makes little sense for him
to choose a research project that involves technical expertise beyond his present capacity unless he
is interested in acquiring the required extra knowledge or can count on the collaboration of an expert.
Similarly, it makes little sense for him to choose a research project that requires data collection and
long time to complete unless his tenure position and salary are not affected by the required
completion time.
At a given point in time, therefore, what constitutes a rational choice among research
projects, depends on the pertinent econometrician's research interests, his knowledge, and his
awareness of possible research projects.  It also depends on the environment in which he works and
on the financial resources of his academic community.  Finally, it depends on the place in the career
ladder in which he operates.  A Ph.D student may find it advantageous to work on  problems that
interest his thesis adviser since that may provide him easy access to funding and expert advice.  Ease
of funding and the research interests of colleagues may also be the deciding factors in a young51
econometrician's choice of research activities.  For a more established researcher the search for
knowledge and the desire to help solve his country's pressing economic problems may be the
overriding reasons for his selection of research topics.
Choosing a research project is a multifarious process.  Thomas Kuhn envisions it as a choice
between normal-science puzzles that might throw light on relevant aspects of some given scientific
paradigm (Kuhn, 1970).  Imre Lakatos thinks of it as a choice between positive heuristics of a
research program that needs development (Lakatos, 1978).  Finally,  Karin Knorr-Cetina insists that
it is part of a social process of negotiation that is situated in time and space and should not be
analyzed with the logic of individual decision making (Knorr-Cetina, 1981, p. 152).  It is quite clear
that many of the theoretical problems that econometricians tackle can be viewed as normal-science
puzzles.  It is also evident that it is possible to think of an econometrician's empirical work as
providing the right of existence for positive heuristics of a pertinent research program.  However, I
do not believe that Knorr-Cetina's view of the products of science can be used to describe an
econometrician's choice among research projects.  For the average econometrician his own
evaluations are as important as the social process of negotiation in which he at times may find himself.
I have no case study other than my own on which to base my opinion about the way that
econometricians choose their research projects.  Except for details and a good bit of luck, my case
study is probably like the case study of any representative US econometrician.  It will, therefore,
serve to illustrate the ideas that I have tried to express above.
E.24    As a Ph.D. student I decided on my own the thesis topics on which I wanted to write, and I chose
my thesis advisor accordingly.  My thesis was accepted in 1962, and after further studies, its three parts appeared
as journal articles in 1964, 1967, and 1969.
In my first real job as an assistant professor of economics I found myself less than a hundred yards from
an outstanding math department with an extraordinary group of probabilists and mathematical statisticians.  They
invited me to participate in a seminar in which we were to read a newly published book on a certain family of
random processes.  The seminar discussions were very inspiring and, for me, resulted in four published papers.
The first I wrote alone.  The other three were joint work with one of the other seminar participants.
In 1968 I accepted a job as an associate professor of economics at a new university.   There I decided
that it was time to write an applied econometrics paper.  A few years back, two distinguished professors had
published interesting studies concerning risk aversion and choice of safe and risky assets.  Also, researchers at a52
government institution had collected data that, on the surface of things, looked suitable for a test of the
professors' ideas.  So I reformulated the theory on choice of safe and risky assets for the empirical analysis,
received copies of the given data, found a willing expert on computers at a neighboring University to help me out
with the data analysis, and was all set to start the test.  Then I discovered an aggregation problem in the theory
that had to be solved before I could carry out the empirical analysis.  The solution to the aggregation problem I
found first ten years later with the help of results that colleagues at other universities published in 1974 and 1976.
In the latter part of the seventies I moved as a full professor of economics to a third university.  There my
salary was determined independently of my publications.  That gave me a chance to devote most of my free time
to writing a monograph on methodology that I thought my profession needed badly.  In the process I also
managed to finish the empirical analysis of risk aversion and the choice of safe and risky assets.  The reults  form
two long chapters in my methodology book.   The latter a distinguished university press was kind enough to
publish in 1990.
To all this I should add that when the opportunity presented itself in 1968, I chose to move from one
economics department to another that had more people working on problems of interest to me.   The new
department was a very inspiring and congenial place in which to work. So, while waiting for a solution to my
aggregation problem, I published roughly two papers a year.  I resigned in 1978 for family reasons alone not
knowing that Frau Fortuna was still looking out for me.   My third university had a math department with an
excellent group of logicians and two extraordinarily helpful computer experts.  Without them I might still be
working on my monograph.
Over time the choices of research projects that the members of an academic community
make have an interesting dynamics of its own.  In seminars and conferences, econometricians present
their results, exchange ideas about each others research projects, and share information about
theoretical and applied results in related areas.  In that way the current results of some may provide
inspiration and important inputs for future studies of others.  Also, the cumulative efforts of many may
provide knowledge for government agencies and central statistical offices that will lead to better
ways of collecting statistical information and to the collection of new and interesting data.  Finally, the
shared information about theoretical and applied developments in related areas may suggest new and
exciting research opportunities for the seminars and conference participants.
Three examples of the dynamic process that I have in mind are the elusive Phillip's curve, the
current estimates of vintage price functions and depreciation profiles for the US National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA), and the many arch- and garch models of financial markets.  The first
originated in E.B. Phillips' study of "Inflation and Unemployment in Great Britain during the period
1881-1957" (Phillips, 1958).  It resulted in decades of concerted efforts by econometicians to53
establish a stable relationship between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment in
economically developed countries.  The second can be seen as the result of four decades of joint
work by Dale Jorgenson and many others to provide the US NIPA with internally consistent
measures of capital stocks and depreciation  profiles (Fraumeni, 1996).  The third was the result of
Rob Engle's discovery that characteristics of the conditional variance of a wide-sense stationary
process have an interesting bearing on the efficient market hypothesis (Engle, 1982).
For all I know, it might be a good way to view an econometrician's choice of research
project as the choice of a puzzle that needs a solution.  Then we could think of E.B. Phillips' paper as
a search for a deep parameter in Keynesian macroeconomics.  Similarly, we could consider Dale
Jorgenson's et al's work as a joint venture to determine how best to measure the depreciation of
various kinds of capital assets.  However, I believe that such a view of these research activities is
missing a very important point:  Good econometric work has three sides, an economic side, a
statistical side, and an applied side.  These sides interact in interesting ways in the dynamics of
research choice.  Looking back at the development of econometrics during the last fifty years is like
watching a beautiful mountainside full of crisscrossing paths that aim for the top.   If we were to take
a hike along one of the paths that emanate from E.B. Phillips' paper, we might meander through
various applied papers, discover papers by Ed Phelps and Milton Friedman on the natural rate of
unemployment, run across Robert Lucas' introduction of the REH in macro economics, and wade
through papers on the statistical problems of analyzing REH models that Hashem Pesaran describes
so well in his book on The Limits of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis.  At some point the
path would come to a halt in waiting for another econometrician's choice of research project to carve
out the next few meters.  If we should come back to this point next year, we might find that the
choice has resulted in a discourse on the dire effects of multiple equilibria in the labor market, the
discovery of a new deep parameter in macro economics, or, simply, a novel way of applying the
GMM estimation method.
V.2  Model Selection
Each research project comes with problems that require solutions.  Solving them involves
choices of a varied kind.  Here the problems that an econometrician encounters in selecting models54
for his empirical work are of special interest. We shall, next, discuss characteristics of rational choice
in solving model selection problems.
Model selection in econometrics is not an easy task.  A long time ago, Edward Leamer
observed that the data banks of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) contained
time-series data on two thousand macroeconomic variables.  With these data, a given
econometrician who restricts himself to exactly five explanatory variables, can estimate 2.65 · 10
14
different linear equations (Leamer, 1983).  Using one second on each equation, it would take him
more than thirty-one million years to estimate all of them.  The econometrician does not have that
many years.  So, if he is to use the NBER data, he must select a subset of the available variables and
search for a useful linear or nonlinear relation among them.  Model selection in econometrics is about
how best to choose variables for an empirical analysis and about how to search for the linear or
nonlinear relations among them that will best serve the purposes of the analysis.
V.2.1  Bridge Principles
To me an empirical econometric analysis is an instant of an economic theory-data
confrontation.  So, in our discussion of model selection we shall take for granted that the pertinent
econometrician has a theory that he intends to confront with data.  We shall also assume that the data
he will use belong to a data set that he or somebody else has collected.  Finally, we shall assume that
he has already chosen a data set for his empirical analysis.  Then, the first problem our
econometrician must solve is how best to relate the variables in his theory to variables in his data
universe; i.e., to variables and constants whose values he has observed and to function- and
predicate variables that he has created with them.
Relating theoretical variables to variables in a data universe in a meaningful way is a tricky
matter that requires both a good grasp of economic theory and knowledge of related empirical work.
For example, in studying consumer choice we must decide on the reference of 'consumer' and find
good ways to measure some of his or her characteristics.  We must also account for the fact that the
theory is about choice of single commodities and assets while our data usually refer to aggregates of
commodities and assets.  Finally, we must search for reasonable measures of prices of aggregates55
and decide whether to to treat variables like permanent income as unobservables or look for good
proxies.  Whatever choices we make, we must provide justification for them with reference to theory
and related empirical work.  We must also account for them in explicitly formulated bridge principles
that relate the theoretical variables to variables in the data universe.  Without the bridge principles the
results of the empirical analysis will be hard to interpret.
E.25  How best to relate variables in a theory universe to aggregates in a data universe is a problem that
arises in many situations in econometrics.  The role that economic theory might play in the search for solutions to
such problems is interesting.  Here are three examples that illustrate what I have in mind.
The theory of consumer choice under certainty concerns choice among single commodities.  What the
theory says about demand for single commodities need not be true of demand for composite commodities.  It is
true, according to the Hicks-Leontief aggregation theorem, if the prices of the components of each composite
always vary proportionately among themselves.  (Stigum, 1990, ch. 10) contains proof of this theorem.
Kenneth Arrow's interesting theorems concerning consumer choice among one safe and one risky asset
need not be valid for choice among one safe asset and one aggregate of risky assets.  They are valid if the
consumer's utility function belongs to one of two classes of such functions that D. Cass and J. Stiglitz delineated
in 1970. For a discussion and proof of this fact cf. (Stigum, 1990, ch. 12).
 In the standard theory of entrepreneurial choice the firm produces one output with the help of capital,
labor, and an intermediate product.  Usually, the theory faces data on firms that produce several different
products with the help of various intermediate products and many different kinds of capital and labor.  It is,
therefore, relevant that a firm's production function must satisfy stringent requirements in order that we be able to
write its output as an aggregate whose production is a function of a capital aggregate, a labor aggregate, and total
expenditures on intermediate products.  Some of these requirements are detailed in (Fisher, 1968) and (Stigum,
1967b and 1968).
The theoretical variables and the variables in the data universe are jointly distributed random
variables.  Hence, the econometrician can specify properties of the probability distribution of the
theoretical variables and use them and his bridge principles to derive salient characteristics of the
process that generated his data - the DGP.  If he proceeds in that way, he can test the empirical
relevance of his theory by checking whether the theory, when translated by his bridge principles,
makes statistically valid predictions about characteristics of the data.
Our econometrician can also delineate  properties of the DGP from scratch and, then, use
them and his bridge principles to deduce salient characteristics of the probability distribution of the56
theoretical variables - the TGP.  If he proceeds in that way, he can test the empirical relevance of his
theory by checking whether the properties of the TGP are in accord with the prescriptions of his
theory.
It must not go unnoticed here that in the first case all tests concerning the empirical relevance
of the theory are carried out in the data universe.  In the second case all tests of the empirical
relevance of the theory are carried out in the theory universe - the universe of the theoretical
variables.  Whether the econometrician has a choice as to in which universe to carry out his tests,
depends on the way he chose to formulate his bridge principles.  Since this is an important fact, I
shall give several simple examples below to illustrate what I have in mind.
E.26  Consider the five-tuple of real-valued random variables, (y,u,c,x,z), and assume that the first three
components reside in the theory universe and that the last two roam around in the data universe.  Suppose also
that, according to theory, TH is valid.
TH:  There is a finite, positive constant, k, such that c = ky.
Finally, assume that the variables in the two universes are related as follows:
B1:  y + u = x, and  B2:  c = z.
We shall consider three different cases for the analysis: I, II, and III.  In each case we assume, without say, that a
deamon has produced N independent draws of the values of y,u,c,x, and z, and that he has only revealed to us the
N values of the pair, (x,z).
I.              I.  In this case we impose conditions on the probability distribution of the theoretical variables and use
these conditions and the bridge principles, B1 and B2, to deduce restrictions on the probability distribution of the
pair, (x,z).  Specifically, we assume that A is valid.
           A.  The means and variances of y, u, and c, are finite and satisfy the conditions, Ey >0, Eu = 0, Ec > 0,
ryu = 0, sy
2 > 0, su
2 > 0, and  sc
2 > 0.
From these conditions and the bridge principles we can deduce the validity of TI 1.
TI 1:  If A, B1, and B2 are valid, then the means and variances of  x and z are finite and positive.
Those are the only restrictions on the distribution of x and z that we must heed when we search for a distribution,
CGDI, of x and z that, in David Hendry's terminology, generates a congruent model of our data.
The theory that we formulated in equation TH and the bridge principles impose further restrictions on
the distribution of x and z that the CGDI might not satisfy.  Here they are:








The interesting part of TI 2 is that the conclusion holds only if the covariance of x and z satisfies equation HI.
                                                    HI.   rxz = sz
2/k
2.
Checking whether HI with k = Ez/Ex is valid, provides us with a test of TH and A in the data universe.57
II. 
             II.  In this case we start by deriving the distribution of x and z that generates the pertinent gongruent
model of our data without making any assumptions about the distribution of y, u, and c.  With this distribution
and the bridge principles on hand we can establish the following theorem:
            TII.1:  Let CGDII be the distribution of (x,z) that in case II generates the pertinent congruent model of our
data, and assume that B1 and B2 are the bridge principles that relate the components of (y,u,c) to (x,z).  Then the
following equations must be valid: Ey + Eu = Ex, Ec = Ez, sy





TII.1 and TII.2 below demonstrate that we cannot construct a test of TH in the theory universe without
making appropriate assumptions about the distribution of (y,u,c).
TII.2:  If TH, B1, and B2 are valid, and if (x.z) is distributed in accordance with CGDII, then the following




2, ryu =  rxz/k - sz
2/k







III.  In this case we proceed the way we did in Case II, and we let CGDII be as we described it there.  To
obtain a test of TH in the theory universe we must add to TH a condition on the distribution of (y.u.c).  The
required condition is stated in TIII.1.
TIII.1:  Suppose that TH, B1, and B2, are valid.  Suppose also that Eu = 0 and ryu = 0.  If (x,z) is
distributed in accordance with CGDII, then the conclusion of TII.2 is valid.  In addition, it must be the case that
H* is valid as well.
                          H*:   ksy
2 = rxz  with k = Ez/Ex.
Then H* provides us with a test of TH, Eu =0, and r yu = 0 in the theory universe.
There are two aspects of the preceding example that are special.  First of all, in analyzing the
three cases we implicitly assume that we are engaged in an analysis of N independently and
identically distributed observations on the pair, (x,z).  That allows us to coach the discussion in terms
of properties of the distribution of (y,u,c,x,z) instead of the distribution of the demon’s N
independent draws of the given five-tuple of random variables.  Except for the simplicity in
presentation, the ideas that the example illustrates generalize to analyses of panel data and time-
series data as well.
Secondly, the bridge principles involve all the components of (y,u,c,x,z).  That is not
generally the case.  In a theory-data confrontation often only a subset of the theory's variables are
involved.  Who they are depends both on the data and on the kind of confrontation the
econometrician has in mind.  Also the data we use are often constructs that we have created with the
help of many auxiliary variables.   Usually, only a few of the latter play an independent role in the58
theory-data confrontation.  Those that do not and the left-out theoretical variables are not related to
each other and to other variables in the bridge principles.
V.2.2  Data Analyses
Choosing variables for the data universe in a prospective theory-data confrontation is
difficult.  It is, therefore, important to be aware that the choice might have fundamental consequences
for the relevance of the empirical results.  Left-out variables can confound causal relationships and
lead to misrepresentations of dynamic characteristics.  To see how,  just envision yourself studying
the effect of a retraining program for unemployed workers on their employment possibilities.  You
have observations from two disjoint groups of individuals one of which has been exposed to the
retraining program.  To avoid confounding causal effects, you must find a way of rendering the
groups observationally equivalent.  That requires having observations on a number of the salient
characteristics of each group.  To avoid misrepresenting dynamic characteristics of the labor market,
you must also find appropriate numbers of lags for the variables that end up being included in your
analysis.
The idea of confounding causal relationships is related to the idea of noncollapsibility in
regression analysis.  Suppose that the theory in the theory-data confrontation insists on a causal
relation between two variables, x and z, in which x is the dependent variable and z is the independent
variable.  Suppose also that we have independently distributed observations in the data universe on x
and z, and on the variable, v.  Finally, suppose that that the three data variables have finite means and
variances, and that there exists a function, G(￿): Rﬁ R, such that
                            G(E{x|z}) = a + bz, and  G(E{x|z,v}) = a + bz + cv.
Then the regression of x on z,v is collapsible for b over v if b = b (cf. Greenland et al, 1999, p. 38).
If it is, we may ignore v in our search for the causal relationship between x and z.59
It is not the place here to discuss sufficient conditions for collapsibility.  However the
relationship between collapsibility and rationality in model selection is relevant.  For that purpose
observe that, in the case considered above, there exist vectors of constants, (a1,b1) and (a2,b2,c2),
and variables, u1 and u2 , with finite means and variances that satisfy the conditions:
                   x = a1 + b1z + u1, E{u1} = 0, and  E{zu1} = 0;
                   x = a2 + b2z + c2v + u2, E{u2} = 0, E{zu2} = E{vu2} = 0.
With our data the least squares estimates of the constants in these equations are consistent, but might
be biased.  They will be biased in the first (second) equation if E{u1|z} (E{u2|z,v}) varies with z
((z,v)).  A heteroscedastic u1 (u2) indicates that E{x|z} is nonlinear.  Therefore, many
econometricians will insist that we look for a linear or nonlinear relationship between x and z and
other variables in the data universe in which the pertinent conditional mean of the error term does not
vary with the values of the independent variables.  E.27 gives an example of a successful search for
such a relation.   The example is a freely recanted case study based on pp. 480-481 in (Anderson
and Vahid, 1997).
E.27  A and V  have James Tobin's data on food consumption, household income and household size in
the US in 1941.  To determine the causal relationship between these variables they begin by estimating a linear
equation.  The result is as follows:
          log FOODCONi = 0.82 + 0.56  log HINCi + 0.25  log AHSIZEi + ui, i ˛ N
                                         (0.1)   (0.03)                   (0.04)
Diagnostic specification tests show strong evidence of heteroscedasticity and nonnormality in the residuals.
Also an LM test suggests that the variance of the residuals varies with the size of the sample’s (income/houshold
size) groups.   This indicates that a weighted regression might be appropriate.  Running the pertinent weighted
regression, they obtain
      log FOODCONi = 0.73  +  0.59  log HINCi + 0.23  log AHSIZEi + ui . i ˛ N.
                                     (0.07)    (0.02)                    (0.03)
Now tests for heteroscedasticity and non-normality in the residuals fail to find evidence of misspecification.
However, an LM test for omitted nonlinearity indicates that the log-linear specification they are using is
inappropriate. A and V end up choosing the following (weighted) regression as a model of the causal relation
between the three variables:
      Log FOODCONi = 0.91 + 0.54   log HINCi - 0.43 log AHSIZEi +60
                                     (0.11)  (0.04)                     (0.22)
                             0.17  (log AHSIZEEi)(log HINCi) + 0.14  (log AHSIZEi)
2 + ui . i ˛ N.
                            (0.08)                                                 (0.09)
Diagnostic tests based on this specification have failed to find any evidence of misspecification.
The preceding comments and examples illustrate some of the issues with which an
econometrician must cope in crossection analyses (CRA).  The same issues arise in time-series
analyses (TIA) as well, but there they seem to be much more involved.  In CRA the values of the
variables we observe pertain to a given period of time.  In TIA we have observations on the values
that a set of variables assume in many different periods of time.  In CRA we divide the variables into
dependent and independent variables, and we insist that in the equations we estimate the error terms
be stochastically orthogonal to the independent variables and homoscedastic.  In TIA we also have
dependent and independent variables and we insist that the error terms in the equations we estimate
be orthogonal to the independent variables and homoscedastic.  In addition, we insist that the error
terms vary over time according to the laws of a purely random process, and that the parameters in
each equation be independent of time.  Finally, when we use the TIA model for prediction, we insist
that the past values of the dependent variables do not affect the current values of the independent
variables.
In searching for a final model that satisfies the strictures that I listed above (STR), different
econometricians will proceed in different ways.  For example, a Baysian like Edward Leamer will
envision a family of alternative models and choose among them according their respective posterior
odds (cf. Leamer, 1983, pp. 288-291).  A non-Baysian like David Hendry will start by analyzing the
empirical relevance of the most general, estimable, statistical model that he believes can be
postulated initially - that is his GUM (cf, Hendry, 1995, p. 361).  In his analysis, Hendry will use
standard testing procedures to weed out statistically insignificant variables and to check whether the
reduced equations satisfy the pertinent STR.  The weeding out process may lead to different terminal
model specifications. If it does, Hendry will choose as a final model one whose characteristics cannot
be explained by any of the other terminal models.
In my view there are three aspects of Hendry's method that are relevant here.  One aspect is
interesting because it lays down a rule for rational choice in model selection.  Specifically, Hendry61
insists that the GUM contains a vector of parameters, m, whose values the empirical analysis is to
determine.  A proposed step in the reduction process is allowed only if it does not lead to a loss of
information concerning the values of the components of m.
A second aspect is interesting because it seems to exhibit an important lacuna in Hendry’s method.
In spite of Hendry’s insistence that he takes theory into account in his statistical analyses, I have
difficulties seeing where hypotheses such as the TH in E.26 play a role in Hendry’s reduction
process.  To me the natural place in Hendry’s analysis to introduce hypotheses like TH is at the end.
Hendry’s final model provides a ‘best possible representation’ of the DGP, and it is such models
with which we ought to confront our theoretical hypotheses.  That brings me to a third aspect aspect
of Hendry’s method that is particularly intriguing to me.  The reduction process may have many
terminal models.  Among them there may be many that cannot be encompassed by the other terminal
models.  That suggests to me that we combine data confrontation of theoretical hypotheses and
choice of terminal model in a decision-theoretic analysis of the terminal models.  That can be done in
different ways and I shall describe one of them below.
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V.2.3  Statistical Decision Theory and Time-Series Analysis
In (Stigum, 1967a) I developed a decision-theoretic approach to time-series analysis that
can be applied in the left-out analysis of Hendry’s terminal models.  This is so even though   my
article concerns univariate time-series models only.  With some obvious modifications my theoretical
arguments can be applied in multiple time-series analyses.  In fact, with the appropriate modifications
my decision-theoretic time-series analysis will apply to all the cases we considered above since an
econometrician in characterizing a pertinent DGP must describe the bahavior of independent as well
as dependent variables.  Unfortunately, the formalism in my approach is involved and, for the
uninitiated, the theorems are not easy to comprehend.  Therefore, I shall here only sketch the ideas
that I tried to convey in my paper.
In statistical decision theory the econometrician is a gambler playing a game against nature,
and the strategies of nature are identified with the unknown statistical parameters in the relevant
problem.  To describe nature’s strategies in time-series analysis I need the following definition.62
D.1  Let (W,￿,ˆ) be a probability space.  On this space a stochastic process is a family of
random variables, {S
tx(w), t˛T}, where x(￿) is measurable with respect to ￿, and S is a single-
valued shift operator that takes ￿ into itself and preserves complementations and countable
intersections of events.  Also T is an index set.  If T = {…,-1,0,1,…}, then S is assumed to have a
single-valued inverse.
A time series is a partial realization of a stochastic process.  Hence most statistical analyses
of such series are conducted for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the structural
properties of the underlying process.  That involves studying characteristics of the shift operator, S,
and a parameter, q, that in some sense determines the properties of the probability measure ˆ(￿) on
(W,￿).  Consequently, we can adopt D2.
D.2  Let Y be a set of single-valued shift operators on (W,￿) and let {ˆq:q˛F} be a family
of probability measures on the same space.  The set of pure strategies of nature is a set ` of the form
` = Y·F.
This sounds much more remote than it is.  So here is an example to fix our ideas.
E.28  Consider a stochastic process, {S
tx(w): t˛T}, and let x(t,w) = S
tx(w), t˛T.  Also, suppose that there
exist constants, cj, j= 1,…,m,  and a random process, {Sh
th(w):t˛T} such that, for all w˛W and all t˛T, x(t,w) =
￿1£j£m cjx(t-j,w) + h(t,w), where h(t,w) = Sh
th(w),  t˛T.  Also suppose that the h(t,￿) constitute a normally
distributed, purely random process that is orthogonal to the x(t,￿) and has mean m and variance s
2.  Then Y can be
taken to be a  compact subset of R
m and F can be chosen to be a compact subset of R·R++.
We shall only consider fixed-sample-size games.  Thus a time series will be a vector r˛R
n+1,
where r = (rt,…,rt-n) for some fixed n and t˛T.  The probability distribution of r is represented by a
function, q(￿|￿):R
n+1·Y·FﬁR+ , where for each pair (S,q)˛Y·F, q(￿|S,q) is a continuous density
function on R
n+1, and for each r˛R
n+1, q(r|￿) is a measurable function on Y ·F.  The measurable sets
in Y·F are determined by a metric whose definition varies with the problem we are studying.
We shall denote the set of policies of our econometrician by A.  A randomized strategy on A
is a function, j(￿|￿):￿·R
n+1ﬁ[0,1], where ￿ is a s-field of subsets of A.  For each r˛R
n+1, j(￿|r) is63
a probability measure on ￿, and for each b˛￿, j(b|￿) is measurable with respect to the Borel
subsets of R
n+1.  The set of randomized strategies I shall denote by Y.
I assume that our econometrician will choose a strategy that minimizes his expected risk.  To
characterize such strategies we much first describe the econometrician’s risk function.  For that
purpose I let L(￿):Y·F·YﬁR be his loss function and I insist that, for each choice of strategy by
nature, (S,q), our econometrician’s expected risk equals the value of the function,
                      r(S,q,j) = IRn+1IA L(S,q,a)dj(a|r)q(r|S,q)dr.
A given j˛Y is inadmissible if and only if there is a j*˛Y such that , for all (S,q)˛Y·F,
r(S,q,j*) £ r(S,q,j) with inequality for some pair (S,q).  Otherwise j is admissible.  For a given
prior, x(￿), on the subsets of Y·F, j* is a Bayes strategy if IY·F  r(S,q,j*)dx(S, q)  £   IY·F r(S,q,
j)dx(S,q) for all j˛Y.  Finally, a pair, (x*,j*), constitutes a pair of ‘Good’ strategies for nature
and the statistician if it satisfies the conditions, IY·Fr(S,q,j*)dx(S,q) £ IY·Fr(S,q,j*)dx*(S, q) £
IY·Fr(S,q,j)dx*(S,q), for all (Y,q,j)˛Y·F·Y.
With that much said about time series and strategies I can state the first theorem.  In the
statement of the theorem, a class D of randomized strategies is said to be complete if and only if, for
all jˇD,$j*˛D such that, for all (S,q)˛Y·F, r(S,q,j*)£ r(S, q,j) with inequality for some (S,q).
SDT.1  Let Y·F and A be the sets of actions open, respectively, to nature and the
econometrician, and suppose that, for each pair, (S,q) ˛ Y·F, q(￿|S,q) is a continuous density
function on R
n+1.  Finally, let L(￿) be the loss function on Y·F·A and suppose that Y·F and A are,
respectfully, compact in the metrics,
1.  d((Sn,qn)-(Sm,qm)) = sup a˛A |L(Sn,qn,a)-L(Sm,qm)| +
                                              IRn+1e
-|r| |q(r|Sn,qn)-q(r|Sm,qm)|dr, and
2.   d(an,am) = sup (S,q)˛Y·F |L(S,q,an)-L(S,q,am)|.64
Then both nature and the econometrician have good strategies, and the classes of admissible and
Bayes strategies are complete.
Here is an example to show that the model in SDT.1 specializes to the standard statistical
model of testing a simple null-hypothesis against a simple alternative hypothesis.  The interested
reader can find the missing arguments in the example on p. 220 in my paper.
E.29  Suppose that Y and A consist of two elements each, (S1,S2) and (a1,a2), and that q is known.  Also,
suppose that L(S1,a1) = L(S2,a2) = 0, L(S1,a2) = b, and L(S2,a1) = 1, and that q(￿|Si), i=1,2, is a continuous density
function on R
n+1.  Then Y, A, and q(￿|￿) satisfy the conditions of SDT1.  Consequently, both nature and the
econometrician have good strategies and the classes of admissible and Bayes strategies are complete.
The class of Bayes strategies is easy to characterize in this case.  Let (a,1-a) be a prior distribution on Y.
The corresponding family of Bayes strategies, {ja
l(￿|r)}0£l£1, are completely characterized a.e. with respect to
q(￿|Si), i=1,2, by the rule
                                      1 whenever q(r|S2)/q(r|S1) < ba/(1-a)
                ja
l(a1|r) =     l whenever q(r|S2)/q(r|S1) = ba/(1-a)
                                      0 otherwise
The class of Bayes strategies is obtained by letting a vary over [0,1].
To obtain the class of admissible strategies we note that in the present case any admissible strategy
must be Bayes against some prior measure on Y.  Also, a Bayes strategy against a pair, (a,1-a), with a > 0 is
admissible.  Finally, when a = 0 (a = 1),j0
l(a1|r) (j1
l(a1|r)) is an admissible strategy.  This description determines
the class of admissible strategies a.e. with respect to q(￿|Si), i=1,2.
At last the econometrician’s good strategies.  Since r(Si,￿) is a continuous funtion of j on Y, for each
i=1,2, a good strategy, j*(￿|￿), must satisfy the functional equation, r(S1, j*) = r(S2,j*).  In particular, if j* is non-
randomized, if C = {r:j*(a1|r) =1}, and if for i=1,2, Q(B|Si) = IB q(r|Si)dr , then C must satisfy the equation, bQ(C
c|S1)
= Q(C|S2).
The next theorem concerns the problem of finding a good predictor of x(t+1,w), given that r
is the observed value of (x(t,w),…,x(t-n,w)).  For simplicity, I shall assume that q is known.
SDT.2  Let l(￿):RﬁR+ be continuous and such that l(x) = l(|x|) and such that           lim
xﬁ￿ [x
2/l(x)] = 0.  Also, let g(￿|￿):R·R
n+1·YﬁR+ be such that g(x|￿) is measurable with respect to the
pertinent family of subsets of R
n+1·Y and g(￿|r,S) is continuous on R, and suppose that g(￿|r,S) is the
conditional density function of x(t+1) given that (x(t),…,x(t-n)) = r. Finally, suppose that, for each
S˛Y, the density function of r, q(￿|S), is continuous on R
n+1, and that Y is separable in the metric65
        d(Sn,Sm) = IRn+1IR e
-|(y,r)||g(y|r,Sn)q(r,Sn)-g(y|r,Sm)q(r|Sm)|dydr,
And let the risk function of the econometrician be defined by
                r(S,t) = IRn+1IR [|x-t(r)|
2/(1+l(x))] q(r|S)g(x|r,S)dxdr.
Then the econometrician has a good strategy, t*(r), and the class of admissible strategies is
complete.
The assumptions of SDT.2 were not strong enough to establish the existence of a good
strategy for nature and the completeness of the class of Bayes strategies.  However, we can obtain a
characterization of all Bayes strategies as follows.  Let dx(￿) be an a priori probability measure on Y;
let    dqx(x|r) = IYg(x|r,S)q(r|S)dx(S)dx / IRIYg(x|r,S)q(r|S)dx(S)dx; and let                qx*(r) =
IRIYg(x|r,S)q(r|S)dx(S)dx.  Then
                     r(x,t) = IRn+1IR [|x-t(r)|
2 /(1+l(x))] dqx(x|r)qx*(r)dr’
which is greater than or equal r(x,tx), where
                 tx(r) = Eqx((x/(1+l(x))|r) / Eqx((1/(1+l(x))|r).
Now, r(x,t) = r(x,tx) for some t(￿) if and only if t(￿) = tx(￿) a.e. with respect to qx*(￿).  Hence tx(￿) is
Bayes against dx(￿).  Since dx(￿) was chosen arbitrarily, tx(￿) gives the general form of Bayes
strategies up to the usual equivalence.
V.3  Publication   66
We have discussed various aspects of the choices that an econometrician faces in his search
for a happy ending to his research project.  In each particular case what the econometrician finds
rational to do is determined by his pecuniary and technical resources, by his stock of tacit
knowledge, and by socially constructed rules for valid arguments.  Now we shall discuss the choices
that the same econometrician faces when he decides on the best way to present his results to
colleagues and other interested parties.  The factors that determine rational choice in such situations
are a varied lot.  Those that underlie characteristic features of an applied econometrics paper are of
special interest here.
The first decision that an applied econometrician must make in writing his report concerns its
format.  In deciding on a format he must consider all the good stories that his results allow him to tell.
The contents of these stories and the way the stories are related depend on the results that he has
obtained and on the economic theory that motivated his analysis.  He must also consider ways in
which he can combine the pertinent stories in the writing of interesting papers.  Each combination of
stories and outline of a paper single out a small set of journals that might be interested in publishing
such a paper.  The relevant set of journals varies with the chosen combination of stories.  To finalize
the choice of format for his report, our econometrician must weigh the advantages that each journal
offers a contributor in the form of prestige, good referees, and chances of acceptance.  The
comments of good referees help in formalizing the final version of a paper.  Prestige is important for
promotion, salary increases, and the respect of colleagues.  Good chances of publication are relevant
since rejection will delay publication of the paper, and the lost time may be disadvantageous in a
career perspective.
   Suppose now that our econometrician has decided on a combination of stories for a paper
and singled out a journal to which he will submit the paper.  In writing his paper he is likely to adhere
to a standard form of an applied econometrics paper.  So when the paper  is ready for submission,
we expect that it will contain an introduction, sections that relate the theoretical motivation of the
study and the characteristics of the data, a section that presents the results, and a conclusion with lists
of notes and references.67
Different methodologies have different ideas as to the contents of the various sections.  Here
is what I believe.  The introduction should introduce the subject matter of the paper, tell in general
terms how the main results of the paper are related to the works of others, and provide an outline of
the paper.  The sections on motivation and data ought to contain, among other things, a formal
statement of the presuppositions of the study, a list of assertions to be confronted with data, and a
thorough discussion of relevant characteristics of the given data.  The section that presents the results
ought to contain a sketch of the theory and data universes with a list of all the bridge principles that
our econometrician has adopted.  It should also contain a list of his results with a discussion of their
statistical properties and their economic interpretation.   Finally, the section ought to contain a
congruent specification of the process that the econometrician believes generated his data.  The
conclusion of the paper should contain a summary of the paper and suggestions for further studies.
Judging from the looks of published applied econometrics papers, writing an introduction is a
political act.  It is required that the author tells how his results are related to the results of others.
Who these others are, depends of course on the author's results.  Unfortunately, it seems that it
depends on many other matters as well.  From one point of view it might be disadvantageous to refer
to all the pertinent others. Journal space is limited, and too many references may throw doubts on the
need to publish the results.  Also, some of the others might not belong to the author's 'ingroup' and
can, therefore, be safely ignored.  From another point of view it might be advantageous to refer to
the works of some colleagues even though their results are barely tangential to the results of the
present author.  The relevant colleagues might be prospective reviewers of the paper.  They might
also be powerful members of the author's department or of some department to which the author
intends to establish a good relation.  Finally, they might be colleagues whose works a knowledgeable
econometrician is supposed to have read.  Neil Ericson and John Irons' extraordinary study of the
citations of R. Lucas' 1976 paper on nonautonomous econometric relations is a case in point.  Of the
513 citations that Ericson and Irons examined, 327 mentioned Lucas' paper only in passing, 98
discussed Lucas' ideas in the context of the topic at hand without examining their empirical relevance,
and only 88 attempted to assess the implications of Lucas' ideas (cf. Ericson and Irons, 1998).
The content of the sections on theoretical motivation and data will vary with the purpose of
the theory-data confrontation to which the paper pertains.  Even so, the econometrician in his68
comments must face squarely the fact that the references of most of his data belong to a socially
constructed world of ideas that has little in common with the social world in which we live.  In order
that his empirical results have relevance he must take care to explicate the meaning of his theoretical
variables.  He must also delineate the characteristic features of our social reality to which his theory
addresses itself.  First when this is properly done, can he use the insight it brings to interpret the
empirical results that he recants in a later section of the paper.
                        To be concluded.
Notes
1,    The relevant translations with commentaries are (Foster and Humphries, 1951),  (Hammond,
1902), (Lawsen-Tancred, 1986), (Ross, 1980), and parts of Jon Vetlesen's unpublished lecture
notes on Aristotle at the University of Oslo.  The page references in de Anima refer to pages in
Hammond's book.
2.  The idea of this example is taken from an article by Evans-Pritchard on "Levy-Bruhl's Theory of
Primitive Mentality."  I learned of it from reading Peter Winch's article on "Understanding a
Primitive Society" (cf. Wilson, 1970, pp. 79-80).
3.  J. Eichberger and D. Kelsey have considered gametheoretic situations in which the players'
mixed strategies are taken to be superadditive probability distribuitions (cf. Eichberger and
Kelsey, 1993).
4.   There is a fourth interesting aspect of Hendry's method that I aught to mention here.        Hendry
and Hans Martin Krolzig have managed the extraordinary feat of constructing a software
program, the PcGets, that will perform the whole reduction process automatically (cf. Hendry
and Krolzig, 1999).  In their simulation studies their program managed to zero in on the true
DGP in 95% of their case studies.69
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